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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
There can be no response initiatives without a plan and there can 
be no plan without an understanding of the problem. 
 (McGrath, 2000:85) 
 
This thesis will study the changes taking place in Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) in light 
of a general shift toward participatory approaches in development theory and policy. HMA in 
Mozambique is undergoing a transition affecting the very definition of the landmine problem; 
the focus of study is shifting from the minefield to the community, thereby shifting the 
problem analysis away from seeing landmines as the threat in themselves towards 
understanding how landmines affect the community in which they are placed. This shift 
entails a radical rethinking of the concept of impact and a need for new indicators that can 
reflect the impact of landmines on the community. This challenge has been met through the 
establishment of a national Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) using community participation to 
assess landmine severity.  This thesis will argue that although the concept of impact has been 
redefined to reflect how communities are affected by landmines, the tool established to 
understand and reflect local landmine severity is unable to fully access local knowledge and 
analysis or to enable local realities to be reflected in the priorities for mine action.  
1.1 The shift toward local knowledge 
The past decade has seen a change in development policies. Focus has moved away from the 
holistic state- and market-oriented development strategies toward the empirical local 
participation for development. Priorities are no longer set by outside experts but as a result of 
community analysis of the local context. Robert Chambers (1995), one of the leading analysts 
within the development of participatory approaches, has gone as far as to call it a shift of 
paradigms.  
This substantial shift is aided by the fact that two opposing positions in development theory, 
the new left and the new right, have converged in the attention given to the grass-root level 
and the valorisation of local knowledge (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). This convergence is 
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caused by a joint frustration over the dysfunction of states and markets as well as their 
inability to promote sustained growth and empowerment. The state is still an important actor 
in the development arena, although its role is drastically reduced compared with its position in 
early development economic theories. Today the state in developing countries (primarily 
African) is often described as being “bloated” or as a patrimonial network guided by the 
politics of the belly (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993). Market deregulation was long 
seen as the better development strategy but proved to have dramatic side effects as markets in 
developing economies were not fully developed and in need of further support structures to 
penetrate down and generate generalised growth. These strategies were seen to be holistic in 
the sense that their logic sought unified solutions for the whole body of development 
challenges. This holistic focus has come to be seen as ineffective for targeting poverty, and 
the importance of the strategies has been challenged by approaches that are more empirically 
based and responsive to local contexts. In this way there has been a shift that emphasises two 
parallel concerns, the neoliberal need to bypass states and markets but also the more radical 
need to empower marginalized groups in their relations to states and markets (Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000).  
The new orthodoxy has evolved around the use of participatory approaches with the broad 
aim of increasing the involvement of socially and economically marginalized people in 
decision making that regards their own lives. The approaches enable communities to define 
their problems, analyse their situation and develop solutions that would resolve their 
vulnerabilities. The approaches aim to build community ownership of the development 
process, making development organisations facilitators in community initiatives. The 
community provides the expert knowledge and the situation analysis based on the local 
context and understanding of the problem complex, contrary to traditional holistic 
development assistance in which situation analysis is conducted by outside professionals, 
often based on blueprint policy recommendations from New York or Washington.  
This thesis highlights a parallel between the shift within mine action and a general shift within 
development thinking. Perhaps due to its background and short history, mine action has, more 
than most other development and reconstruction initiatives, been centrally planned and 
executed. Operational success has been measured through cost effectiveness and the number 
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of munitions that are removed. Improvements have been measured in more effective clearing 
techniques and better ratings of the number of munitions cleared per dollar. The reason for 
this may be that, historically, landmine clearance has been conducted by military personnel 
with knowledge of explosives disposal. This foundation lingered on as mine action1 
developed into an emergency activity, with priority given to facilitating the rapid repatriation 
of refugees or to enable swift deployment of emergency aid through the clearing of roads and 
infrastructure. Effectiveness being a key word, this led to a strict organisational discipline, 
usually similar to military command structures. Such organisational characteristics have 
produced centrally planned initiatives with little ability to adapt to local conditions. The 
assessment of landmine severity was set by outside professionals, who gave priority to 
emergency operations.  
This way of conducting HMA failed to address to what extent the problems caused by 
landmines affect the local community, and demining organizations paid little or no attention 
to local needs and assessments when setting priorities for their activity. The result was that 
HMA projects were not necessarily channelled to those communities where the impact of 
landmines was the most severe. 
During the second half of the 1990s the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
became a potent political movement that inspired the establishment of an international law 
against production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines by December 1997. This 
political and civic movement was vital to strengthen the humanitarian aspects of HMA and to 
move away from the exclusive focus on the technicalities of clearing explosive devices, which 
had separated mine action from other forms of emergency and development initiatives. With 
the growth of the international campaign and the consolidation of HMA within the 
humanitarian sector, the need for new indicators of success emerged. HMA organisations 
needed to be able to assess how landmines affected the communities in which they were 
placed. One response was the development of a new means for assessing the effects of 
landmines, the Landmine Impact Survey, which placed the community at the centre of 
analysis. The growing attention to socio-economic impact represents a quiet revolution in 
                                                 
1 The use of the term mine action will refer to HMA, and the two terms will be used interchangeably throughout 
the thesis. 
 3
HMA and is now examined by the Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC)2 
project (Millard and Harpviken 2000; 1).  
1.2 The Mozambique LIS  
In 1997, in parallel with the establishment of an international ban against landmines, several 
key mine action NGOs established an initiative to map the extent of the global landmine 
situation. It was realised that the information at hand provided a poor reflection of how 
countries were affected and, even more so, how communities were affected by landmine 
contamination. The initiative that was established aimed at mapping all landmine-affected 
countries through a Global Landmine Survey (GLS) organised through the Survey Action 
Centre (SAC) consortium. SAC has since conducted LIS projects in several countries, 
including Yemen, Chad and Thailand3 and are currently conducting nine further surveys. 
In Mozambique the national organisation for coordination of HMA, the Instituto Nacional de 
Desminagem (IND), requested a survey of the landmine situation in the country4. The contract 
for the Mozambican survey was given to the Canadian International Demining Corps (CIDC)5 
with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDC, with the 
assistance of an independent consultant company – P.F. Wilkinson Inc. – linked its survey up 
to the GLS initiative, but the CIDA funding and their need for transparency and simple 
organisational structures limited the extent of the CIDC cooperation with SAC. All LIS data 
including the CIDC data from Mozambique are entered into a Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) database called the Information Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA)6. Because of IMSMA, the standardisation of data and calculation of impact were 
similar for surveys from different countries, and they could therefore be compared. The UN 
was responsible for quality assurance. Hence the freedom of the CIDC team behind the 
Mozambique LIS was relatively limited and materialised mainly in the choice of 
                                                 
2 Based at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
3  See SAC web page http://www.sac-na.org/  
4 See web page: http://www.ind.gov.mz/index.htm 
5 See web page: http://www.cidc.ws/CIDC-CanadianInternationalDeminingCorps.htm 
6 Created and updated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. See: http://www.gichd.ch 
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methodology, particularly in how socio-economic information was gathered in the group 
interviews. 
The LIS surveys epitomise the quiet revolution within HMA and are the showpiece of the 
local adaptation of mine action, redefining the logic of landmine surveys. The unit of 
investigation has shifted from the minefield to the affected community. The survey 
investigates socio-economic aspects of how the landmines affect the community in which 
they are placed. The latter is achieved by using a composite indicator composed of three types 
of factors: presence of munitions, resources blockage and number of recent victims. 
Importantly, the LIS maps these factors through the use of participatory group interviews at 
the community level. The survey maps the impact on the community through open questions, 
such as “What problems are caused by landmines in this community?”, rather than gathering 
information from the minefield, thereby valorising local knowledge and their realities. The 
contrast is large to the earlier surveys, which gathered technical information found in the 
minefield, based on expert opinion and professionalism. 
The survey fits into the shift toward local knowledge in development theory because it uses 
the community analysis to define the insights and perspectives of how the landmines affect 
everyday life. The survey aims to identify those villages that have suffered greatly from mines 
and highlights these communities for priority attention.  
1.3 Aim of the thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to study the changes taking place within HMA in the light of the 
general shift toward participatory approaches in the theory of development and post-war 
reconstruction. Two central aspects of the shift, both of which will be discussed with specific 
reference to the Mozambican LIS, constitute the focus of the analysis: 
• 
• 
To what extent does the participatory approach succeed in bringing to the foreground 
local knowledge and analysis as held by a variety of members of the local 
communities?  
To what extent is local knowledge and analysis reflected in the priorities for mine 
action? 
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The first research question focuses on how the principle of participation is translated into 
practice within the Mozambican LIS survey and on how the methodology influence the ability 
to map the social and economic consequences of landmines. The second research question 
looks at how local knowledge is analysed to form the basis for mine action policy and 
practice, by studying how the survey data are used to establish impact, to rank communities, 
and, ultimately, to establish priorities for action.  In terms of research strategy, this thesis is 
based on one extensive community study, on fieldwork with a LIS survey team, as well as 
document review and interviews with key decision makers. The thesis will study local 
responses to living with landmines and assess the manner in which these local realities are 
reflected within the Mozambique LIS. Ultimately, it will assess how the shift enables 
communities and local knowledge to form mine action priorities. 
The impact of landmines is measured in many ways; the focus on individual victims was 
important for the popular movement behind the ICBL, while economic calculations 
measuring income loss from area denial are a common impact assessment within several 
HMA organisations. This thesis focuses on the social implications of landmines and is driven 
by the need to see landmines as something more than a physical hindrance for development. 
Landmines are an embedded feature of many conflict-ridden societies, and how people 
respond to the continued threat of living with this weapon of terror must be seen as one of 
several factors influencing social development in the post-conflict situation. This often entails 
persistent social divides where lack of trust hinders effective network building while 
maintaining post-war trauma and material deprivation. The effects of landmines cannot be 
understood apart from this larger context. Similarly, the material manifestations of landmines, 
like killing and maiming, cannot be fully understood apart from the responses they cause in 
the community. In this sense the fear of landmines might be more real than the threat they 
represent; it is the fear that guides the action of the individual, and therefore it may be 
appropriate to focus on people’s perceptions rather than on objects. This abstract argument 
has quite concrete consequences. Landmines cannot be reduced to the resources they block 
simply because resources and impact are not necessarily the same. It is this complexity that 
can highly complicate the process of mapping impact. 
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Therefore, analysis of the landmine problem must be linked to the concrete contexts and to a 
deeper understanding of local responses to landmines. This insight is not particular for 
landmines, but reflects something that is universal for all aid – the need to give value to local 
needs and realities and to be responsive towards these. 
1.4 An overview of the general contents of the thesis 
The following chapter will discuss methodology, both as a foundation for this study and as a 
basis for assessment of the Mozambique LIS. I will first go through the fieldwork, 
commenting on the various forms of data gathered and discussing how these generate 
adequate responses to the research questions. The main discussions of this chapter focuses on 
the community interview, the LIS study and the document review; furthermore, attention will 
be given to the data analysis in general. 
Chapter three will examine the shift toward valorising local knowledge in development 
theory, including a discussion of the methods applied, the evolution of the shift, as well as 
emerging critiques of participation. The second half of the chapter will go through the parallel 
shift within HMA and describe how the quiet revolution within mine action can be seen as a 
part of the shift within development thinking. This chapter will also situate the LIS in relation 
to the shift. 
Chapter four presents the Chifunde case study and serves as a background analysis for the 
discussions in the two following chapters. The chapter presents the case study in the context 
of a Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA), aiming to achieve an in-depth understanding 
of local responses to living with landmines. This analysis is central to frame the discussions of 
how the participatory aspects of the LIS enable local analysis of socio-economic impact of 
landmines and how this knowledge can be reflected in mine action policy and praxis.  
Chapter five goes through the LIS survey interview conducted in Chifunde in light of the 
participatory ambitions of the survey, with reference to central points in the critique that has 
been brought against participatory approaches. The chapter analyses how participatory aspects 
influence the mapping of impact and ultimately to what extent the LIS is able to map socio-
economic aspects of landmines in Chifunde.  
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Chapter six looks at how the LIS, at a general level, uses the situation analysis produced by 
the group interviews to establish an assessment of the landmine severity in the community. 
This discussion will look more closely at the survey indicators themselves. Using the analysis 
of the Chifunde data as a basis, the chapter will question the extent to which the survey 
analysis can reflect local knowledge in national planning and policy. This final analysis is 
important to be able to place the LIS within the shift and examine how it stands up to the 
challenges of the transferring local knowledge to form national policies.  
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Chapter 2  
Methodology 
The methodology chosen aim to capture the complex local reality of living with land mines 
and to assess the manner in which this reality is reflected within the LIS. Three principal 
sources of information have been utilised: observation in conjunction with the LIS survey; 
interviews with selected key informants in a chosen case study community (Chifunde village); 
and documentation review and key interviews with relevant decision makers. This chapter 
presents and discusses each of the three principal sources of information in relation to how 
they form the basis for this thesis; furthermore, the chapter goes through the data analysis and 
ethical considerations connected with the fieldwork. 
2.1 Research strategy 
Choice of method will determine what type of information is gained from the interviews 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994). The application of qualitative methods was natural as the 
interview format let people express their own understanding of the problem complex:  
There is a move away from obtaining knowledge primarily through external observation (...) toward an 
understanding by means of conversations with the human beings to be understood. The subjects not 
only answer questions prepared by an expert, but themselves formulate in a dialogue their own 
conceptions of their lived world. The sensitivity of the interview and its closeness to the subject’s lived 
world can lead to knowledge that can be used to enhance human conditions. (Kvale 1996: p.25) 
The choice of in-depth semi-structured interviews as a means to access information was 
instrumental to get access to individual perceptions and understandings of how the 
community and the individuals were affected by landmines. Qualitative methods are well 
suited for establishing a dynamic understanding of the problem under scrutiny, portraying 
both the complexity and the context of the situation under study (Robson, 1993).  
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted from September to December 2000 in Tete 
province in Mozambique. My fieldwork in Mozambique has three main components. First, I 
accompanied the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey. Secondly, I returned to one of the 
communities visited with the LIS survey team to do a community study, which gave me the 
opportunity to study a landmine-affected community as well as to see the Mozambique LIS 
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survey in relation to the community descriptions of landmine impact. I spent approximately 
three weeks in the field for each of these two components. This gave me adequate time to get 
acquainted with the otherwise unfamiliar settings of the field operations. Thirdly, I conducted 
documentation review and interviews with key actors within the HMA in Mozambique to get 
an insight into the process of identifying the impact of landmines. 
The time I spent with the Mozambique LIS was vital to understand how the socio-economic 
indicators were integrated into the new landmine survey. Staying with the LIS survey teams 
enabled me to obtain firm knowledge of the procedures used to conduct the survey and how 
the communities were enabled to analyse the local landmine situation, informing the LIS 
about the socio-economic impact on the community. It also gave me insights into the 
everyday life of the survey team, travelling the country with a tent and a survey questionnaire, 
working long days to resolve problems such as not finding reported villages or not having 
access because of lack of roads. More generally, it helped me understand how academic 
values and intentions are reflected and maintained despite obstacles met in the everyday 
running of the survey.  
The community study was conducted with the assistance of the Norwegian Peoples Aid 
(NPA) 7. Due to the risk posed by landmines it was deemed important, also for the researcher, 
to have access to the communications, medical backup and evacuation possibilities that the 
NPA provided for demining operations. The benefits of conducting a community study were 
twofold. Studying a landmine-affected community gave me a firmer understanding of the 
consequences landmines have on the daily life of individuals both socially and economically 
and gave me an understanding of the individual responses to these problems. The community 
study also set the frame for understanding the Mozambique LIS by providing an in-depth 
study of the reality that the survey was trying to capture. Staying with the NPA gave me the 
possibility to see the size and scope of a mine clearance operation and develop an 
understanding of technical as well as social and organisational challenges encountered in the 
field. Combining these two parts of the fieldwork was instrumental to answer the first 
research question of the extent to which the participatory approach succeed in bringing to the 
                                                 
7 For more information on NPA, and it’s involvement in HMA, see website: http://www.folkehjelp.no/index.htm  
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foreground local knowledge and analysis as held by a variety of members of the local 
community. 
The field study, however, could only inform my understanding of the gathering of data. To 
ascertain how the data were used and analysed, attention had to be given to document reviews 
and interviews with relevant HMA organisations. Formal contact and correspondence were 
established with SAC and the CIDC to get access to documentation on the process of analysis. 
Further information was gained through institutional interviews during and after the fieldwork 
period. I conducted two visits to Maputo, for briefings and debriefings with the CIDC, as well 
as interviews with key officials at other relevant organisations. These trips were conducted 
before and after the fieldwork.  
The choice of location for my follow-up community study was dependent on two factors. 
First, it had to be in a village that I had visited together with the LIS survey, which would be 
the only way to study and build a comparison with the findings gathered by the LIS survey. 
Secondly, the village would have to undergo humanitarian demining, since the risks involved 
in living in a landmine-affected community necessitated logistical support from a demining 
agency. The Mozambique LIS was conducting the survey in Tete at the time that I was 
planning fieldwork. This district was the base of the NPA’s headquarters and one of the main 
areas of NPA demining operations. The NPA was also a natural point of contact on the basis 
of the long and firm cooperation the AMAC project had with the NPA in Mozambique. The 
coinciding of these two factors was important for the timing of my fieldwork.  
At the time of the LIS survey the NPA was conducting four parallel demining operations in 
Tete province, and the survey had already mapped three of these four villages. Of the four 
areas Chifunde turned out to fit my needs for a community study very well. The village had 
been affected by the presence of landmines for almost ten years. This would expectedly have 
led to a considerable degree of adaptation to the landmine threat and would enable the study 
of community responses to living with landmines. Furthermore, the landmine problem was 
directly related to the village and had social and economic implications. It was a case that 
would potentially be informative both in terms of how a community is affected by the 
presence of landmines and in terms of how a community may adopt to living with landmines 
over time. 
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2.2 Studying the LIS survey  
During the period I spent with the LIS survey team they investigated twenty suspected mine-
affected areas in the two districts of Tete province: Chifunde and Macanga. Two of the twenty 
sites were inaccessible by car and could not be visited. The survey team was composed of two 
interview units that could work independently, when needed. I witnessed the mapping of 
fifteen areas during my stay with the CIDC. I was also able to observe two official interviews 
with District Administrators. The official interviews would function to ask permission to 
conduct the survey in the respective districts and to get the logistical support needed to go 
though with the mapping. The survey team would also crosscheck the information on the 
suspected mined areas with the information of the local administrations.  
Even though many suspected mined areas were reported, many of the reports proved 
unsubstantiated, and not many landmine-affected areas were identified during the LIS study. 
The result was that I only attended two group interviews during the period I accompanied the 
LIS survey team. Clearly, this constitutes a deficiency in the data, but through my fieldwork 
with the survey team I gained considerable insight into how the survey was conducted. These 
data form the basis for methodological discussions of a more general nature. The problem of 
90% overreporting of suspected mined areas was unusually high compared with the rest of 
Mozambique but does reflect the poor quality of the information that has been available to the 
LIS survey as well as to previous mine action planning. This basic information was gathered 
immediately after the civil war, while there is considerable overreporting of mined areas, 
there are also some areas that were not covered at all.  
During the LIS study I was able to see the whole of the district of Chifunde as well as the 
neighbouring district of Macanga. This gave me a small glimpse of the challenges that face 
the districts in terms of the landmine situation and of economic development and post-conflict 
reconstruction and enabled me to analyse the landmine situation of Chifunde in light of the 
overall landmine situation and development challenges of the district.  
During the LIS study, observations were central to my data collection. The LIS data were 
collected though interviews, and this was a situation in which I was unable to participate 
actively. My analysis of the LIS survey study is therefore based on observing the operation of 
the survey and the procedures surrounding data collection. Observation can give valuable 
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information about the LIS interviewing situation. Notes made while observing the interviews 
were based on how I interpret the situation – that is, observations of sitting arrangements, 
gesticulation and body language and use of voice, etc. These observations will always be 
subjective and would be interpreted differently by other people and in another situation. 
Passive observation is not unusual but as a method it made me dependent on complimentary 
sources of information. Additionally, my knowledge of Portuguese was limited, and the HMA 
operations and Mozambican culture and tradition were also new to me. I was aware of the 
challenges and constantly used the survey team to give feedback and comments on my 
observations. Hence, the data were exposed to the critical scrutiny of those under observation, 
significantly strengthening the quality of the data as well as my understanding of the survey 
process. Supplementary data were achieved through firm knowledge of the survey 
questionnaire, assisted by my limited knowledge of Portuguese. Immediately after the 
interview, all comments were firmly crosschecked with the survey team and their survey 
forms. In this way I made an effort to supplement my own data with survey findings and 
survey team thoughts and comments. Going through the interview also enabled me to 
"synchronize" the various sources of information and see observations in light of the findings. 
On the basis of these data I ensured that my data were not based on assumptions. 
2.3 Conducting a community study in Chifunde 
The field research strategy is based on the Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA) 
developed by Anderson and Woodrow (1989) and is inspired by the AMAC community study 
approach, which has structured the CVA to provide information about HMA (Harpviken and 
Millard, 1999). The CVA analysis assesses what vulnerabilities the community faces in 
relation to landmines and what capacities the community has to counteract and respond to 
issues and feelings of threat. When people live with landmines over long periods of time, they 
will adapt to the situation, and the effects of the weapon can therefore be found in all areas of 
social and economic life in the community. The study of landmines should therefore not be 
limited to the weapons or the objects that they block but rather take a broad perspective to 
encompass the embedded responses to the situation. 
My affiliation with the AMAC community study approach has proved important for my 
research methodology. This community study approach structures the CVA to provide 
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information about mine action by using a Plan of Inquiry (Appendix A) focusing on three 
main areas: economic, human and social fields. During my three weeks in Chifunde I 
interviewed thirty-four individuals, three of them twice. My interviews were mainly semi-
structured, but I also interviewed key informants and made observations, and document 
reviews to gain a broad insight into the challenges that face the Chifunde community.  
The extensive community study approach is not immediately compatible with the format of 
the nationwide LIS survey (Millard and Harpviken, 2001:15-16). The AMAC project 
envisions the use of its methodology after a full country-wide general survey. Therefore the 
community study does not eliminate the need for a wide-scale survey but would see itself as 
complement to such a mapping of landmine presence. Rather than giving information on how 
the mine clearance operator should give priority to the different demining tasks, the 
community study is designed to be fed into the process of landmine clearance, providing 
information on how best to adapt the clearance operation to suit the needs of the community. I 
have used the approach to obtain a deeper understanding of the situation faced by the 
community of Chifunde. 
2.3.1 Choice of informants  
On returning to Chifunde for the follow-up community study I started by introducing myself 
to all the institutions from which I needed approval for my stay. That included NPA, which 
would host me for the next three weeks; the district administrator; and the regional president8. 
Because of my previous visit to Chifunde during the LIS study the introduction to the 
administration and village leaders was more an announcement of my return rather than a 
formal introduction, which had been made when I originally arrived. The formal introduction 
and approval for the study were prerequisite to conduct further interviews, as villagers would 
often prove unwilling to engage in interviews not approved by village leadership (Blom, 
2002; Millard and Harpviken, 2001). The village leadership would in this sense function as 
gatekeepers controlling points of entry into the community and to the informants; which 
                                                 
8 The regional president is an elected regional representative put in place by the FRELIMO government, 
replacing the traditional leadership after it was banned just after independence from Portugal. 
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gatekeepers are used will also influence which informants will eventually be interviewed 
(Goode, 2000; Green and Hart, 1999). 
Different gatekeepers will also give access to different informants. This is a natural effect as 
different gatekeepers have different social networks and motivations for naming potential 
informants (Johnson, 1990).  When I came to Chifunde there was a need to diversify the 
gatekeepers, so as not to rely on a single point of entry. Using the informants who had 
participated in the LIS group interview proved a good way of diversifying the gatekeepers for 
the follow-up community study. By re-interviewing the survey participants it would be 
possible to assess how the survey group interview was composed, how they experienced the 
survey, and general questions about the landmine presence, using the LIS survey participants 
as gatekeepers to provide information on further areas of study in Chifunde. During these 
interviews the informant would present the landmine situation in the community. Whenever 
they came up with illustrations of landmine impact, it would be exemplified through 
individuals having special problems, providing me with names of new people connected with 
issues relating to the landmine problem. For example, during the interviews, the name of 
Socossi came up repeatedly as an example of landmine accidents, as he had lost livestock in 
the minefield. I therefore scheduled an interview with him to hear his side of the story. When 
the cleared land and the need for farmland was discussed, the name of Chagaca was brought 
up as the man who had taken farmland in the previous minefield. When qualitative study is 
being used, it is equally important to understand the variety of issues, choosing informants 
because of their uniqueness, as trying to get a representative sample of informants (Johnston, 
1990; Lofland and Lofland 1995). This gave me the possibility to diversify my gatekeepers, 
not depending on one point of entry to the community. 
In this way it was possible to target informants who had a story to tell. They were chosen 
because they were used as examples in the narratives of others. One interview would answer 
some questions and pose new ones, and the next interview would seek to illuminate the gaps 
left by the previous interview. Hence, each interview stands alone, giving an individual story 
of capacities and vulnerabilities in the responses to living with landmines; at the same time 
they all become part of a bigger picture of challenges faced by the community of Chifunde.  
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[It] is (...) a strength of the interview conversation to capture the multitude of subjects’ views of a theme 
and to picture a manifold and controversial human world. (Kvale 1996: 7) 
I found this way of conducting the interviews to fit the aim of the study, to get an 
understanding of the landmine situation in Chifunde and to get a deeper understanding of the 
various responses to living with landmines.   
Whereas interviewing women did not in itself seem to be a problem in Chifunde, these 
interviews could only be conducted when the head of the household was not present. One 
interview started off by interviewing the wife in a household and went on to interview the 
husband when he came home; in this case the woman left the interview (Interview, Luis). It 
also meant that one interview was held with head of household, whereas the original intention 
was to interview the wife (Interview, Lissene). Usually I was able to target the interview to 
the person of interest and at the end of the fieldwork twelve of thirty-four respondents were 
women. 
The interviews do not primarily aim at facilitating an understanding of the general problems 
faced in the community, but try to identify informants who have information of relevance for 
the study. The method does not try to reflect the average individual in Chifunde. The sample 
of 34 respondents is too small to enable generalisation, and the informants are not by any 
measure selected at random. The informants are chosen to show the contrast, diversity, 
challenges and persistence in the responses of the people who are living with landmines. By 
choosing to focus on individual stories it is possible to get an in-depth understanding of both 
patterns as well as nuances that describe how the community respond to living with 
landmines. 
2.3.2 The interviews  
The feeling of being out of place was strong throughout the fieldwork, and the thesis will 
make no claim to having conducted participatory observations, but in some ways this is true 
for all interview situations. 
The research interview is not a conversation between equal partners, because the researcher defines and 
controls the situation. The topic of the interview is introduced by the researcher, who also critically 
follows up on the subjects’ answers to his or her questions. (Kvale 1996: p.6) 
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As a researcher you are given a position of control by the informants; the ability to get access 
to information demands that the interviewer fill this role by guiding the dialogue and directing 
it towards the topic of interest. At the same time guiding the discussion along a limited 
number of topics will only confirm the pattern of thought of the researcher, bringing up the 
topics seen as important by the researcher, not necessarily those seen as important by the 
person interviewed. It was therefore important that the conversation was only loosely 
structured, allowing the respondents to elaborate on their stories and issues of concern (Kvale, 
1996). There are several techniques for allowing the interview to become a good 
conversation. Being a good listener might be just as important for the interviewer as asking 
the right questions. Silence provides the respondent room for reflection and time to elaborate 
the discussion (Kvale, 1996). The interviews allowed the informant to reflect over issues that 
he or she found relevant, with the aim of grasping or understanding the perspectives and 
perceptions of the person interviewed.  
Another way of achieving a good conversation is by appearing to be naïve or by taking the 
role of socially accepted incompetent (Kvale, 1996). If the researcher appears to have all the 
answers, there seems to be little point in engaging in a good conversation; this is also the case 
if the researcher appears to have no insight into the area in question. A middle ground where 
the researcher is seeking information and is engaged in the discussion is important to get an 
insight into the problems and the responses to everyday problems. I found it difficult to assess 
to what degree I should challenge the information given to me through the interviews, 
particularly because I wanted to get access to the perceptions of threat and the problems they 
faced. Clearly not being critical would, however, leave me open to manipulation by those who 
had reason to place themselves in a particular light or portray their reality in a certain manner. 
Instead of challenging their information, I gave them the opportunity to voice their 
perceptions. The diversity of informants would allow me to triangulate information and assess 
the information in relation to other descriptions (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 21-31). In this way 
I could turn their manipulation to my advantage, as the reasons why respondents feel 
compelled to display reality in a specific way, by strengthening and accentuating their 
perceptions of the problem they face, also shed light on the subject matter. 
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There is an apparent conflict between a dominant control over the interview and the 
facilitation of the good conversation. The ability to strike a balance between them will depend 
on the researcher’s ability to build good relations and trust between himself as a researcher 
and the informant (Arksey and Knight, 1999; Kvale, 1996). Staying in Chifunde for a long 
time did give me the opportunity to build ties with the community and with the NPA camp. 
Living under the same conditions as the demining team was a factor that built trust and 
opened for good conversations (Kvale, 1996). I was included in social events, being invited to 
share newly brewed maize beer by the local banca (kiosk) or on someone’s doorstep. 
Responding pointedly to such hospitality was important to build relations and to gain 
acceptance for my presence in the village. Conversation would be hampered by language 
problems, but conversation would take the form of well-intentioned smiles and gesticulations 
and the universal sign language.  
I lived in the NPA camp, which was located on the outskirts of the village. The separation was 
further increased by the fact that only a limited number of NPA staff spoke the local language, 
Chechewa. My association with NPA may in part have limited my integration into the 
community. As a white, well-dressed, researcher I felt that I was placed in a position of 
control, where the goal of a conversation between two equal parties seemed difficult to 
achieve. But through persistent presence and my continued queries about the community and 
the problems they face I gradually  gained acceptance, striking a reasonable balance between 
the two factors of control and facilitation, hence generating the good conversations. 
2.4 Documentation review and interviews with key HMA actors  
The second research question aims at examining to what extent local knowledge is reflected 
in the priorities for HMA.  This question cannot be answered through the use of fieldwork 
alone but is dependent on further documentation review and communications with relevant 
organisations, including CIDC, SAC as well as the main actors within HMA in Mozambique.  
The survey design was set up through the SAC consortium, and contact with them has been 
important to build an understanding of the concepts on which the survey is based. SAC sets 
common standards for all of the GLS surveys, and the SAC Protocol documents establish 
standards for data collection and data analysis in great detail. These documents have been 
important to understand the rationale behind the composite indicator approach, as well as how 
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the analysis is conducted. Furthermore, I attended the Third Landmine Impact Survey 
Training Symposium held in Oslo, Norway, on the 11-14th of January 2002, by SAC. The 
symposium was intended as an introduction to setting up a national LIS survey, drawing on 
experiences from completed surveys and elaborating on the concepts of impact. This 
symposium also made possible discussions with central actors within the design and 
implementation of the SAC’s LIS surveys. Further information was gathered from research 
papers produced by the SAC, the SAC website, as well as the final report from the LIS in 
Yemen. 
I spent two weeks with the Mozambique CIDC administration and with the analytical office 
for briefings and debriefings before and after the fieldwork. These meetings gave me a firm 
understanding of the scope of the survey as well as an insight into how the data were analysed 
and entered into the survey database. Further information on the survey was gained through 
access to the survey Quality Assurance Monitor (SAC, 2000), the Mozambique LIS Standard 
Operational Procedure and the Mozambique LIS final report as well as the CIDC website. The 
Mozambique survey incorporated some adaptations, deviating from the SAC format, which 
made it important to use sources from both the SAC and the CIDC. After the fieldwork I 
presented preliminary findings to CIDC and to P.F. Wilkinson Inc. Though the focus of the 
correspondence with CIDC was slightly different from that of this thesis, the discussions have 
been highly important for my analysis of the field data and have enabled me to revisit and 
refine the analysis and findings of my fieldwork. The correspondence with CIDC also gave 
me the opportunity to discuss my findings in light of the general survey methodology. 
Documentation review is a content analysis of documents that are initially produced for other 
purposes, comparing different sources of information to shed light on the theme in question 
(Robson, 1993). The documentation used for this analysis consists mostly of official 
documentation of the survey and the survey process. Documents will always be only partial 
representations of a larger whole, which is part of the rationale for fieldwork playing such an 
important part in this thesis. 
In addition to the documentation review, the fieldwork in Mozambique entailed 
communication with key actors within HMA in Mozambique. These organisations had not 
been a part of the design of the survey, but they would be the end users once the survey data 
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had been handed over upon completion. The most important institutional contact was with the 
CIDC office in Maputo and the NPA office in Tete. The CIDC office was very helpful in 
introducing me to the other HMA operators in Maputo and giving me points of contact for 
further organisational interviews. I had two interviews with the IND, who became the owners 
of the survey data upon completion: with the director prior to the fieldwork, to announce my 
presence and introduce my study, and with the deputy director for debriefing after the 
fieldwork. Both of these interviews were important to understand the how the national mine 
action authority envisioned using the LIS survey data when it was handed over to them. 
Furthermore, I had interviews with two of the three dominant HMA operators in Mozambique 
– NPA and UN ADP – as well as other HMA operators such as Handicap International and 
some smaller commercial demining companies9. These NGOs will be the end users of the data 
and the ones ultimately deciding how the Mozambique LIS is going to change how HMA is 
carried out in the country.  
2.5 Data analysis  
The data analysis and the structuring of the data affect how the data are focused and 
portrayed. To reflect the responses of the informants, it is important that the data analysis also 
is able to convey these intentions. Therefore how data are treated and what analytical concepts 
are chosen to structure the data must be adapted to the method of obtaining the data material.  
The analysis of the Chifunde community study was structured according to the framework set 
up by the AMAC project and the use of CVA analysis. The use of this framework will be 
presented in detail in the next chapter, but, in short, the analysis aims to assess the capacities 
and vulnerabilities embedded in the community, with particular reference to the landmine 
problem. The data analysis was simplified by the fact that the focus for many of the 
interviews was given at the outset, since many of my informants were selected on the basis 
that they had a story to tell, because they were affected by landmines in a special way, and 
were used as examples of such in dialogue with other villagers. The analysis did not try to 
achieve a representative sample or try to compare the different perceptions by finding trends 
                                                 
9 The third regional HMA operator is the HALO Trust. For general background on demining in Mozambique see 
Eaton et al., 1997 and Millard and Harpviken, 2000. 
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in the data material. This part of the analysis aims to understand the variety of responses to 
living with landmines and how they affect everyday life. 
The fieldwork conducted with the Mozambique LIS survey demanded a different analysis 
process. The data material consisted both of personal comments and data recorded for the 
survey. Given that there were few group interviews in landmine-affected villages during the 
three weeks of my stay with the LIS, I was left with relatively little information. This was 
particularly restraining when seeking to compare or to diversify my observations and 
impressions. The discussion of the survey interviews will therefore concentrate on the 
Chifunde case but reflect issues that were encountered during the day-to-day activities of the 
survey.  
During the fieldwork, notes and interviews were recorded by hand. I did bring a Mini Disc 
recorder and a PDA to write my findings, but I was reluctant to use them for fear of removing 
attention from the interview. The district administration, health clinic and school did not have 
access to electricity and used typewriters and carbon copy paper. I was concerned that using 
electronic devises would increase distance, between me and the informant, more than 
necessary. During the LIS study, taking notes was not a problem because most of the data 
were my personal comments and observations. Although I did record the responses given to 
the LIS survey during their interviews, most of the information during the interviews was 
based on the behaviours and context of the interviews. After the LIS interviews I would sit 
down with the interviewer and go through the information recorded by the survey team. This 
routine was a good replacement for electronic recording. During the follow-up community 
study I used an interpreter, which has the advantage of giving considerable time to note down 
the response to the first question while posing the next one. In this way the dialogue would 
not stop because I was taking notes. The note-taking in the Chifunde community study meant 
that I lacked the time to note contextual information like moods and gesticulation, as I had 
been able to during the LIS study, but in this case I took care to record these as separate notes 
after the interviews. I have been reluctant to quote directly from the interviews, given the 
inexact form of transcription because of the use of interpreter, as opposed to having been able 
to transcribe the respondents’ answers from their mother tongue. When referring to individual 
interviews in the thesis, I do so to describe the situation of the individual informant or to 
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reflect the sentiments of the respondent given through the interview. This should not be seen 
as the views of the informants but rather my interpretation of their views. 
2.6 Ethical considerations 
Kvale (1996) sketches three arenas for ethical reflection: the informed consent, the provision 
of anonymity and the considerations of consequences of the research on the life of the 
researched. To this discussion I will also add reflections over my position during the 
interviews. 
All interviews were conducted under informed consent, but there are several factors that can 
influence the reason for consent. First of all, the respondent might accept to be interviewed 
out of respect for me as the powerful other or even out of courtesy for the visitor. Consent 
might also be given without the full understanding of the reason for the study, and what the 
information will be used for, despite my attempt to inform properly, both through community 
meetings and individual orientation. The respondent might expect returns from the interview, 
even though I stated otherwise. The purposeless gathering of information might not make 
sense to them; why would I travel across the world only to write a presentation of their 
problems? If they consider giving information to me on the basis of economic returns or the 
belief that I will be able to influence the future development of the community, this would be 
misuse of my position as a researcher; it would also sway the results, giving an adapted 
response, as they would give me information that would benefit their return.  
The informed consent might also be given out of courtesy, while having consequences for the 
amount of time the respondent could use in the fields. The community study did coincide with 
the first rains and the planting season. This was a problem because of the conflict of interest 
this placed on the respondents, between trying to comply with my requests for an interview 
and at the same time spending their days in the field preparing for the planting season. Trying 
to comply with their needs meant that my working day would be very limited; most people 
were tending their fields during the morning hours before the weather became too warm. 
Around noon, when it became too warm to work, I was able to conduct interviews. They were 
tired after a day in the fields and were for the most part relaxing in the shade under trees or on 
their porches.  
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My lack of knowledge of the area made me insensitive to local customs and social codes of 
conduct. This was most apparent in the way people would come to me with gossip. My 
questions during the interviews would often touch upon how the area cleared would benefit 
the community. My interest in the discussions of land use was widely known, and villagers 
would stop me when passing by to spread gossip about how fellow villagers evict tenants and 
lease out land. Although this information was important to highlight the social tensions 
surrounding the issue, using my person to achieve other gains was ethically problematic and 
could limit the way people would trust me with information concerning the land situation. But 
the situation also had the advantage that the opinions were accentuated and pronounced rather 
than hidden from me. 
The respondents in the fieldwork have been given anonymity in the following presentation, by 
replacing the names of the respondents with fictitious names. This decision was taken in order 
to remove information that can trace community conflicts back to individuals in Chifunde10. 
The potential consequences for the informants are also marginal because the audience for this 
thesis is the HMA arena and those who study the use of group interviews to determine policy 
and planning, whereas the Chifunde study is used only to exemplify the importance of 
mapping community diversity as well as reflecting this diversity in the planning process.  
2.7 Concluding remarks 
The methodology chosen reflect the two research questions: first, the field study was 
important to assess the extent to which participatory approaches succeed in bringing to the 
foreground local knowledge and analysis, and, secondly, the field study needed to be 
complemented by a documentation review to analyse how local knowledge and analysis is 
reflected in the priorities for mine action. Both of these research questions are portrayed 
against the background of the Chifunde community study, as an illustration of how the survey 
is able to convey local knowledge to provide information about mine action policy. 
The strength of the methodology lies in the length of the fieldwork as well as the combination 
of a variety of sources of information. The fieldwork period allowed me to get acquainted 
                                                 
10 Interviews will be referred to in the text of the thesis by using the format (Interview, Janeiro) to refer to the 
interview with Maria Janeiro, the list of informants will be given in Appendix B 
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with the initially unfamiliar contexts of the HMA sector and of the Mozambican countryside. 
It was also central to build trust and to form an in-depth understanding of both the LIS survey 
and the Chifunde community. Furthermore, the analysis is strengthened by combining a 
variety of sources, including semi-structured interviews, observation, focus group interviews, 
and documentation review. Similarly, the selection of informants from various levels, 
including the Chifunde community and the LIS survey, as well as HMA actors in 
Mozambique and globally, has proved to be a major asset. Combining different types of data, 
as well as data from various levels, the thesis has a solid foundation for assessing the shift 
taking place within mine action in light of the general shift toward participatory approaches. 
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Chapter 3  
General Trends in Development Aid and Post-War Reconstruction 
This chapter will set the framework for the discussion of the Landmine Impact Survey by 
building an understanding of the debate within development policy and theory from which the 
survey emerged. It will establish a connection between the shift toward participatory 
approaches, with the incorporation of local knowledge into development initiatives, and the 
integration of participatory practices within the HMA sector. By placing the Landmine Impact 
Survey in the context of this shift it will be possible to view the Mozambique LIS initiative 
from a broader perspective, analysing the extent to which the survey is able to map 
community impact and how the survey applies local self-definition of the landmine problem 
to form strategies for mine action.  
3.1 The shift toward participatory approaches  
The emphasis on participation must be said to represent one of the most dominant trends 
within development assistance today. Participation is, and has been, a catch phrase within 
development theory, which evolved during the 1980s and caught on, to become the dominant 
trend during the 1990s. It is frequently seen as the new convention of development and the 
epicentre of a shift of paradigms within development thinking (Chambers, 1995; 1997; 1998).  
The approaches themselves are so diverse and the word participatory so frequently used in a 
variety of situations that it is not possible or fruitful to talk of a unified definition of 
“participatory approaches”. When I still use the term participatory it is because it points 
toward a trend and a shift in the thinking about aid and development. The participatory 
approaches transfer responsibility for development planning and decision making from expert 
professionals to the stakeholders, enabling the latter to make the decisions that affect their 
own lives. The shift ultimately challenges the view that expert knowledge is best suited to 
produce strategies for local development. “Participation” valorises local insights and local 
perspectives on problems and priorities, based on the conviction that these are better suited to 
serve the needs of the poor than those of expert professionals.  
 25
3.1.1 Describing the shift  
The shift towards local responsiveness is best illustrated by the wide number new concepts 
and the variety of areas that has seen a change in focus. Examples are found within rural 
development practices, where there have been a massive increase in the use of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) approaches and in the focus on accumulation of social capital 
(Chambers, 1997; Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996). Examples are also found within discourses on 
democratisation processes, where there has been a shift in focus toward devolution of power 
to local government and on civil society as a control mechanism (Tendler, 1997). Finally 
examples are found in the organisation and distribution of development aid and the reliance 
on Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Tvedt, 1998). These concepts relate in part to 
separate discussions, yet they all illustrate the tendency to focus on the grass root level. 
PRA, the most common method associated with the participatory approaches, can be 
described as a family of approaches, methods and behaviours that enable people to express 
and analyse the realities of their lives and conditions, to plan themselves what action to take, 
and to monitor and evaluate the results (IDS, 1996). PRA is designed to enable the affected 
party to take control over their own development. This strengthening of local capacities also 
aims at strengthening social capital, feeding into the process of building networks, trust, and  
a normative foundation for further self-development (Putnam, 1993)  
The same movement is apparent in the democratisation discourse, with the focus on 
strengthening civil society. Until the end of the Cold War the emphasis was on the need for 
strong states, and outside demands for accountability were not given priority. When the global 
geopolitical climate changed, there was a wave of first elections, close to fifty in Africa alone 
during the first years of the 1990s (Chazan et al., 1999). Despite this new wave of 
democratisation the patrimonial structures of the state commonly prevailed, and many newly 
democratised countries never held second elections (Bratton and Posner, 1998). As a result, 
development policies are increasingly linking development assistance and loans to demands 
for democratic accountability and to the transfer of powers to locally elected governmental 
institutions. Donor communities use considerable resources on building up civil society to act 
as a counterforce to state oppression, since the grass roots, given the right channels, are seen 
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to have the ability to force through political responsiveness for popular demands (Tarrow, 
1998; Tendler, 1997). 
The organisational form of aid has also become decentralised. Whereas the donor countries 
previously both planned and executed development initiatives, through branches of their 
government, today the same donors have little or no operational capacity and are left as a 
purely planning and funding capacity. Although most of the funds are distributed through 
multilateral aid, or as direct subsidies of the state system, NGOs constitute the operational 
capacity in the development arena. From having a rather marginal status in the early 1980s, 
NGOs have flourished and now function as the primary channel of distribution of donor funds 
and as the executive arm of donor community (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs have achieved this 
position because they are perceived as being flexible and target-focused and therefore as more 
responsive to local demands in the distribution of aid (Tvedt, 1998).  
Despite the diversity in the concepts that have entered the development discourse over the 
past decade, they all claim to break away from traditional top-down approaches, mobilising 
local resources to achieve responsiveness to contextual variations. The concepts all reflect the 
same shift, the need to link the development assistance to the local needs, to make aid both 
more relevant and more cost efficient.  
3.1.2 Analysing the shift 
The shift in development policy and theory is aided by the fact that two traditionally opposing 
positions have converged in praising the attention given to the grass-roots level. The 
convergence between the new left and the new right, or, more specifically, the revisionist neo-
liberal and the post-Marxist stance, is caused by a joint frustration over the dysfunction of 
states and markets and their inability to promote sustained growth and empowerment (Mohan 
and Stokke, 2000). 
The state is still seen as an important actor in the development arena, with the right to 
establish the conditions for how aid should be distributed within its borders. Nevertheless its 
role is drastically reduced compared with its position in early development theories, which 
saw the state as the foremost institution in planning and executing development. The need to 
bypass the state is founded on a view of the state as being elitist and guided by politics of the 
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belly (Bayard, 1993; Medard, 1994). Political decision making reflects elitist networks and 
patrimonial structures rather than popular demands (Cabal and Daloz, 1999); states are 
therefore seen as bloated, inefficient and unsuited as a channel for the distribution of aid.  
The neo-liberal theory strongly criticised the dirigiste state and advocated market 
liberalisation as the primary means of development. Neo-liberal policy has gradually become 
the dominant trend within the development arena, reducing the legitimacy of state 
intervention and its protection of internal markets. Because of its one-sided focus on market 
deregulation the neo-liberal theory has been heavily criticised as a developmental strategy. 
Markets in developing economies are seen as infant and dysfunctional, needing other support 
structures to penetrate down and generate generalised growth. This critique has been 
counteracted by expanding neo-liberal policies – labelled structural adjustment with a human 
face – which supports the building of a civil society, and by a focus on social development as 
a means for poverty alleviation. 
Parallel to this shift within neo-liberal theory, radical development theories have seen a 
similar movement in their call for local empowerment. Although both of these theoretical 
perspectives use the concepts of local participation and empowerment, their understanding of 
power diverges (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Where the revised neo-liberal stance pictures the 
participation and development at the grass roots as a measure to counteract the lacking 
capacity of the state and the market, to penetrate down to reach those most vulnerable, the 
post-Marxist stance pictures empowerment of the grass roots as a way of enabling them to 
break with the marginalizing processes in which they participate (Friedman, 1992).  
This view of empowerment is often referred back to Paulo Freire (1970) and his main work, 
“Pedagogy of the Oppressed”. His argument was that, through education, the illiterate could 
gain a critical consciousness with regard to his or her own oppression, empowering the person 
to identify and analyse the oppressing values and worldviews of the dominant group and how 
the blind acceptance of these values had led to the acceptance of the oppression (Freire in 
Rahnema, 1992). This realisation would enable the oppressed to break with the conditions of 
oppression and take steps to achieve liberation and, ultimately, self-development.  
Although the concept of empowerment is based on Freire’s work, most participatory 
approaches see the oppressed as already having the analytical capacity but as lacking the 
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institutional backing to challenge the existing situation (Chambers, 1997). Participatory 
approaches are therefore a collaboration between those who have knowledge (the oppressed) 
and those who have capacity (the outside organisation facilitating the community 
empowerment). Both Freirian and participatory approaches would see themselves as 
facilitating the oppressed to voice their concerns and demands. The two stances diverge, as 
the participatory approaches seek to utilize already existing knowledge, whereas the Freirian 
approach would be to supply the oppressed with the analytical tools, Chambers’s point is that 
the outsiders do not have the monopoly on the answers supplied to the community, rather the 
contrary; they have the knowledge of the context in which the outsiders must work 
(Chambers, 1997).   
3.2 The participatory approaches 
There are few defining features of participation, rather an aim for good practices. This section 
will describe the foundations and aims of participatory approaches, and outline the criticisms 
that have evolved against them.  
3.2.1 Understanding participation 
The approaches aim at giving the poor ownership of the development process by letting the 
community define its own needs, by assisting the community in achieving those needs, and by 
facilitating its self-evaluation of how the goals were reached. The ultimate aim is that the 
facilitating development organisation takes part in the community initiative, while not 
supplying blueprint solutions for diverse development needs. Most of all this require a change 
in the attitudes and behaviours of the development practitioners, they must no longer perceive 
themselves as the experts but as the facilitators, not as having the solutions but as responding 
to the problem and the solution analysis provided by the community. The process of setting 
priority has moved from valorisation of expert analysis to valorisation of local knowledge. 
Outsiders do not impose their reality; they encourage and enable local people to express their 
own (Chambers 1997; 103). 
To illustrate how power is distributed from the development practitioners to the community, 
Chambers (1997: 117) uses the picture of handing over the stick, illustrating that the 
community is enabled to be the researchers, historians and analysts. Various methods are 
used; the use of focus group interviews has become a trademark of participatory approaches. 
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The group interview discussions enable the community to reach a consensus concerning their 
problems and priorities. The groups can be composed in any manner, either as random or as 
representative groups, consisting of local experts or lay men, but the main point is that the 
dynamics within the group enables efficient analysis and problem identification. Furthermore, 
the participatory approaches use visual and analytical aids such as mapping and modelling, 
time lines and trend change analysis, as well as community judgements, estimates and 
comparisons to describe the extent of problems, not imposing predefined standardised 
measures (Chambers, 1997). The use of different analytical aids and additional sources of 
information enables triangulation of results to check for internal discrepancies in the group 
interview (Johnson, 1990). 
The process of giving local communities control over their own development initiatives is 
described to be empowering (Chambers, 1997). By handing over power, enabling self-
analysis of the problems and building capacities through the interaction between development 
practitioners and community, the process will become sustainable. The community is given 
the tools to sustain initiatives beyond the limited time period of the outside intervention. At 
the same time participatory approaches are designed to penetrate down to the grass roots and 
reach those who need the assistance the most. “For many, PRA seeks to empower lowers – 
women, minorities, the poor, the weak and the vulnerable – and to make power reversals real” 
(Chambers, 1997;106). The powerless are given control over the decision making that affects 
their own life and are able to reach those goals through the assistance of outside development 
initiatives. 
The last two points portray the participatory approaches as cost effective; this is important to 
understand the success of the shift. The participatory approaches are portrayed as more target-
focused and sustainable because they channel efforts to where they are most needed but also 
as achieving more through cost reduction. They are target-focused because development 
initiatives no longer risk conducting operations that are not needed, instead focusing on the 
issues that allow the community to utilise and strengthen already existing resources and 
capacities (Beebe, 2001). By focusing on building capacities, the community will be able to 
sustain initiatives after the operation is concluded, thereby reducing aid dependence and 
increasing sustainability (Kumar and Corbridge, forthcoming). Another reason for the success 
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is the cost reduction achieved through the use of local analytical capacity and labour. By 
letting the community conduct their own development initiative, operators are able to save 
money on administration and labour cost. 
In the early days of participation the approaches were seen as challenging the dominant power 
structures, although they are increasingly being viewed as technical management solutions 
(Guijt and Shah, 1998). The spread of the approaches has led to a proliferation of initiatives 
that primarily aim for the side effects of participation, those of cost reduction and 
sustainability.  
Furthermore, the popularity of the approaches has led donor governments to demand that 
participatory aspects are included in operations. But the use of the approaches does not 
necessarily imply that attitudes and behaviours are changed to fit the method. The transfer of 
power might lead to community decisions that contradict the best judgement of the expert 
professional. Therefore development practitioners might continue to conduct a traditional top-
down implementation of aid distribution, imposing their realities on the communities they 
meet. Scaling up the use of the approaches might also lead to the need for rapid training of the 
so-called community mobilisers and the need for rushing the focus group interviews 
(Blackburn and Holland, 1998). This would imply that the group interview is an insufficient 
basis for achieving a thorough and comprehensive discussion and is becoming a hinderance to 
effective identification and analysis of problem areas.  
The above-mentioned sketch of participatory approaches follows Chambers (1995), who has 
outlined three categories describing degrees of participation. Participation can be an 
empowering process, enabling the poor to achieve self-development. Participation can be used 
as a co-opting practice and as a cost-reduction measure by mobilising local labour to cut 
costs. Thirdly, participation can be used as a cosmetic label to make whatever is proposed 
appear good, while the process continues to produce top-down decision making without the 
ability to benefit from the local knowledge and analysis. The view is strongly held among 
leading PRA practitioners that processes should only be described as ‘PRA’ if they are 
empowering, especially for those who are vulnerable (Chambers, 1995; 37). 
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3.2.2 Impact assessments using participatory approaches 
The success of the participatory approaches has spread rapidly to most sectors of 
development. The spread of the approach enabled individual initiatives to benefit from local 
knowledge but left a gap between the development initiatives on the ground and the policies 
that were produced by expert opinion. In order to ensure that national development strategies 
reflects the needs of the powerless, it is necessary to integrate participation into the process of 
setting policy priorities. 
Beginning in small-scale projects in the late 1980s in India and Kenya, the approach has since 
experienced a massive expansion in both the number and type of organisation which apply and/or 
promote it. We are now beginning to see how the cumulative impact of the spread of PRA has moved 
across and up: regional and national policy decisions, and even strategies of large scale international 
donor or regulatory agencies, not just micro, project level realities, are being (re)formulated at least 
partly as a result of scaling-up of the approach. (Blackburn and Holland 98; 1) 
The needs of the poor should not be limited to influencing the individual development 
initiative but should also be reflected in overall development policies and in national 
strategies for poverty reduction. Scaling-up therefore refers not only to an expansion in the 
application of the approach but also to the process of aggregating information beyond the 
case-specific context, to form policy considerations as well (Blackburn and Holland, 98; 
Booth and Holland 98; Cromwell et al. 2001; Marsland et al. 2000; McGee, 2002; Norton et 
al., 2001; Whitehead and Lockwood, 99). The use of participation is therefore not only set as 
a standard and a requirement for development initiatives but is also integrated within the 
process of defining policy. Through this scaling-up, participation moves from an extreme 
focus on an empirical level to influence considerations on a systemic level.  
Focus is now given to integrating participatory aspects and local knowledge into development 
policy by using participatory methods in national surveys yielding standardised data. These 
impact assessments are commonly referred to as Participatory Assessments (PAs) (IDS, 
1996). The inclusion of the participatory method within national surveys can be traced back to 
the 1990 World Development Report and to the introduction of the New Poverty Agenda 
providing a decisive change in the World Bank approach toward participation in poverty 
assessments (Chambers, 1997; WB, 1990). The main application today is within the 
Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) that form the basis for the World Bank’s Poverty 
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Reduction Strategy Papers, which are designed to plan debt alleviation for Highly Indebted 
Poor Counties (Whitehead and Lockwood, 1999).  
Although the World Bank is clearly a major actor it is by no means alone in utilising PAs in 
national assessments. For participation as a whole there is a tendency to focus on more 
content-specific assessments, using focus groups to inform development practitioners about 
isolated issues of interest. Participation is increasingly used within content-specific 
assessments carried out to form strategies on a national or regional level.  
The need to use local knowledge and analysis to form national policies has instigated a wide-
ranging debate concerning how to best integrate qualitative and quantitative information and 
achieve the best of both worlds  (Booth and Holland 1998; Cromwell, 2001; Kanbur, 2001; 
Marsland et al.2000). Chambers (2001) sketches three ways in which participation could be 
used to integrate qualitative and quantitative methods: first, in large-scale surveys, by using 
PRA-related methods and analysis in the survey process; secondly, through aggregating 
information gained from focus group interviews, where the group interview initially was 
established for other purposes; and, thirdly, through utilising techniques where individual or 
group estimates form the basis for analysis – for example, census maps. By integrating 
qualitative and quantitative methods, it is possible to allow local knowledge to form general 
priority setting and the establishment of policy.  
3.2.3 Criticism against the participatory approaches 
The criticisms against the participatory approaches are becoming quite extensive (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Kumar and Corbridge, forthcoming; Guijt and Shah, 1998; Mohan and Stokke 
2000, Nelson and Wright, 1995). The critique contests the concept of power used within the 
participatory approaches, ultimately challenging the ability of the approach to bring to the 
foreground local knowledge and analysis as held by a variety of actors within the local 
communities. These critiques challenge the ability of the approach to redistribute power, both 
within the community as well as between the development practitioners and the aid recipients. 
Both points attack the rationale behind participation: the ability to understand local realities. 
The first critique addresses the question of whose interests are represented through 
participatory approaches generally and through the use of group interviews specifically. This 
critique addresses the issue of local power structures and how group interviews can function 
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as a tool to consolidate or even exacerbate the differences in power which exist in the 
community. The second critique addresses how the approach is capable of gaining access to 
local realities and perspectives, questioning whether the approach is able to empower the 
community to define and analyse their own situation, or whether the group interview adapt its 
responses to the facilitating organisation. The following will review the two sides of the 
critique and summarise by looking at the dangers of simplifying the community responses. 
The first critique of participatory approaches – what we may label the power-centred critique 
– challenges the assumption that the approaches are able to penetrate local power structures 
and reach those who need assistance the most. Despite the aim of reaching the most 
vulnerable, there is a real danger that participatory approaches reinforce the position of local 
elites through the focus group interviews rather than engaging vulnerable groups in the 
community (Kumar and Corbridge, forthcoming). The inability to reach vulnerable 
individuals is not surprising, as local elites have more to gain from participating than do the 
powerless. There is power in participation, through controlling and defining access to 
development resources. As such, the group interview becomes an arena where struggles for 
power and control are fought. By seeking community consensus through group interviews, 
local elites are able to strengthen their positions. By striving for community consensus, 
development projects cannot expect to change local systems of politics or stratification. The 
fear of losing a central position within the village, because of social mobility connected to the 
power of participation, gives local elites a greater incentive for participating. The 
marginalized, on the other hand, do not necessarily see the benefits of participating in the 
focus groups. They might expect the village elites to manage the process, finding themselves 
playing a secondary role, not expecting to gain benefits from the group interview and the 
initiatives resulting from it (Kumar and Corbridge, forthcoming). This can lead to 
participation fatigue and disengagement, making the most vulnerable reluctant to engage in 
participatory initiatives. Disengagement could therefore be seen as a political response by 
which the marginalized seek other solutions (see also Bratton 1994).  
Using a Foucaultian understanding of power, Kothari (2001) and Mosse (2001) illustrate how 
participatory approaches can strengthen existing power structures. Foucault describes power 
as hidden and disguised but circulating within all social relations. Through the group 
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interviews, local elites are able to express and strengthen existing structures of power. Tacit 
forms for power determine who participates and who does not but also determine what 
realities are portrayed within the group interview. Thereby participation can further exclude 
and marginalize the group it is trying to reach (Kothari, 2001). The group interview is itself an 
arena where power battles are played out. This view of the participatory process highlights the 
importance of being critical in the selection and use of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers will 
ultimately decide who gets to participate and therefore whose reality is portrayed. 
Understanding who is used as a gatekeeper as well as making an effort to diversify the use of 
gatekeepers, can be important steps to make sure that the vulnerable are included in the 
participatory process.  
The second critique directed toward the participatory approaches challenges the assumption 
that the approaches are able to gain access to local realities – what we may label the 
knowledge-centred critique – arguing instead that the group interview adapts responses to fit 
the focus and capabilities of the facilitating institution. Participatory approaches are designed 
to let the poor bring forward their own insights and perspectives, letting them define their 
problems and priorities. This self-definition involves a levelling out of differences in power 
between the development organisation and the locals. The aim is that the development 
operator no longer holds the power to decide which initiatives are best for the community. 
Despite the aim of levelling out power between development operators and the community, 
the fact remains that the outside organisation is still in control of the resources. To qualify for 
access to aid resources, the group interview will tend to produce the answers that the 
participants think the development organisation wants to hear, giving the answers that will be 
conducive for receiving benefits. This is what Chambers calls the self-sustaining myth 
(Chambers, 1995). Mosse (1994; 2001) found that the community had very realistic ideas 
concerning the type of assistance they could ask for, as well as the practical limitations of the 
facilitating organisation, knowing from the outset what to expect and what not to expect. On 
the basis of this understanding of adapted responses, the group interview simply becomes an 
adaptation to the problem definition given during the initial group discussion, when an image 
of the organisation and its capabilities was formed. Despite aiming for the redistribution of 
power, the development organisation still holds the key to resources and will remain the 
dominant party.  
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Furthermore, the group interview may not be an arena where the group defines their 
perceptions of reality but an arena where they learn to illustrate problems using the concepts 
and techniques relevant to the facilitating organisation. Although the analytical tools are 
locally relevant, they are clearly of much more relevance to the knowledge gatherer than to 
the participant (Kothari, 2001; 149). In this sense the participatory approaches fail to reflect 
local realities, because the analytical process of the group interview is made impossible 
without using the analytical framework and language set out by the development discourse 
(Kothari, 2001: 150). The realities of the community are forced into a framework defined by 
outsiders; thereby the group interviews are simply reproducing predefined images and 
realities (Kothari, 2001).  
Much of the critique of the participatory approaches can be summed up as a lack of 
consideration of local complexities. The approaches sketch a simplified “us” and “them”. This 
simplification also neglects all differentiation within the community, and the village appears 
as a uniform entity, where all villagers have similar problems and also similar responses to 
these problems. This simplification hides conflicts of interests and contesting views, 
concealing how the group interview functions as an arena where issues of power and conflicts 
of interests are fought out. Furthermore, this simplification hides the dynamics between the 
group and the facilitating organisation, in particular how the group participants are compelled 
to adapt responses to the interviewing situation rather than display local realities. Because of 
this simplification, development initiatives do not necessarily respond to the needs of the 
community or reach those who need assistance the most. A more nuanced understanding of 
power would have enabled the practitioners to counteract (although hardly prevent) the two 
critiques that have been set forth against participation. 
3.3 Shift within mine action theory and policy 
The aforementioned shift towards participatory approaches within the development 
community at large has also affected mine action, a sector that has been relatively specialized 
and isolated. The shift within development thinking, towards the valorisation of local 
knowledge, is reflected in the LIS surveys with the integration of local knowledge and 
analysis to form mine action priorities.  
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3.3.1 The quiet revolution 
Humanitarian mine action is a young field within humanitarian aid, only a little more than ten 
years old. Prior to 1990, little public attention was paid to the magnitude of the landmine 
problem or the scale of the landmine crisis. Landmines were generally considered a military 
issue left to explosives experts within military organisations. Humanitarian organisations 
building up a capacity in mine action have relied on the military for technical competence but 
have simultaneously adopted organisational practices that are very different from those 
normally associated with humanitarian aid (Horwood, 2000). Operations management often 
resemble military command structures, built around large demining platoons. The size and 
rigidity of the operations has been reflected in the decision-making process, and priority has 
often been set in accordance with to operational feasibility within the given safety standards. 
HMA was viewed as a pre-development activity, a task that needed to take place before 
reconstruction could commence. Demining was carried out to facilitate access for emergency 
aid or to open up areas for repatriation of refugees. Overall priorities were set through expert 
planning, with little effort to analyse the social context in which the demining projects were to 
have an effect.  
The success of the ICBL has also increased attention given to the humanitarian consequences 
of landmines. The focus on human suffering, and on the effects these hidden weapons can 
inflict on whole societies, changed the focus of HMA from emergency relief to development 
planning. This led to a need for new indicators of success in mine action, with a stronger 
emphasis on seeing landmines as an integral part of the post-conflict situation and on 
evaluating how landmines affect the community. This represents a move away from defining 
success through the number of munitions cleared or the number of refugees whose 
repatriation had been facilitated, to a broad focus on reduction of accident potential, as well as 
on economic and social gains, including how HMA contributes to peace and reconciliation 
processes. The move from seeing mine action as an emergency activity to seeing it as a 
humanitarian activity implied also that the focus was shifted from the minefield to the 
community; the interest is now less on the mines themselves and more on the people living 
with mines. 
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It is this move to see HMA as a part of general post-conflict assistance that is termed the 
“quiet revolution” within mine action (Harpviken and Millard, 1999). The new focus on 
community development has clear implications for how success is measured. Identifying 
issues that hinder development is complex, however, because of the feeling of threat 
associated with the weapon. The fear instigated by landmines will have just as real effects on 
the actions of the individual as the presence of the object itself, and therefore removing 
landmines does not necessarily solve the problem. When dealing with landmines, it is 
therefore important to take into account the terror element of landmines. Landmine assistance 
must assess how long-term conflicts affect the social fabric of societies, through, for example, 
integrating the building of trust toward the clearance process into mine action (Millard et al., 
2002).  
All assistance given to war-torn societies must be based on an understanding of local 
complexities. Any assistance failing to adapt assistance to the capacities and vulnerabilities 
present in the community has the potential of doing more harm than good (Anderson, 1999; 
Anderson 1996). Even in the most dramatically war-torn areas there are capacities that can be 
supported and strengthened; by replacing these capacities with external resources the 
community will become aid-dependent and the capacities will wither (Anderson and 
Woodrow, 1989). For example, flooding a region with free emergency food relief might be 
detrimental to any functioning market, removing a permanent capacity and replacing it with a 
short-term substitute. On the other hand, if based on an understanding of the capacities and 
vulnerabilities of the community, emergency aid will have the ability to be more target-
focused and is much more likely to contribute to the rebuilding of the society. In a society in 
conflict and in the post-conflict situation there will be both capacities for war and capacities 
for peace, for conflict and for reconciliation (Andersen, 1999). When an aid agency enters 
into a community, it is invariably in need of institutional backup from local capacities. This 
collaboration will strengthen some local capacities at the cost of others. It is therefore 
important for the development organisation to be aware and to conduct an analysis of which 
local institutions gain from its presence. As one example, the use of local warlords for 
logistical support can sustain the conflict; it is therefore important to identify peace-seeking, 
democratic organisations to supply the logistical support structures (Anderson, 1999).  
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Post-conflict assistance requires a broad-based approach to the reconstruction of societies. It 
is important not simply to reconstruct the pre-war condition, as it necessarily contained 
conditions that led to the war in the first place (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989).  As such, it is 
not sufficient to target the symptoms of the conflict – for example, removing the landmines – 
but it is also important to ensure that the assistance is adapted to the context of the 
community. If HMA operators fail to analyse the situation, they may support negative 
capacities or fail to address local vulnerabilities, doing more harm than good. For example the 
clearing of a road might not be of use to the community because they do not have the capacity 
to rehabilitate it, or they lack transport for accessing markets or government services; as such 
the assistance does not target local vulnerabilities. The same road can be utilised for troop 
movement, strengthening the position of a local warlord.  
Anderson’s (1999) concept of “do no harm” is developed with explicit reference to the 
distribution of aid in a conflict situation. But the importance of understanding community 
complexities is equally valid within any other form of development assistance. As long as 
access to resources implies power, all aid initiatives imply a moral obligation to analyse the 
consequences of assistance. Because aid has the ability to strengthen or change local power 
constellations, it always has the ability to do more harm than good.  
The past ten years has forced mine action operators to rethink the measures of success and 
view mine action as an integral part of conflict-related assistance. The most important shift 
within mine action theory and policy is that success is measured with reference to the ability 
to meet local needs and respond to the ways in which the individual community is affected by 
landmines.  
3.3.2 The Mozambique LIS  
The Mozambique government requested a national mapping of landmines in 1997. This was 
after humanitarian mine clearance had been conducted for five years. There had been previous 
attempts to establish national databases for landmines, but the data were poor, as they had 
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been gathered in an emergency phase of the country’s rehabilitation11. It included far from all 
minefields in the country, and many registered minefields had proved non-existent. Perhaps 
more importantly, the data only gave information on the whereabouts of the minefields. The 
landmine database available to the HMA organisations prior to the LIS survey did not provide 
any information as to the importance of the minefield or the impact it had either on the 
community where it was placed or for development strategies at any level. It is thought that 
the lack of good planning data has prevented the IND, the national HMA coordinating body, 
from fulfilling its role, and that the national LIS survey will prove to be an effective planning 
instrument and enable IND to become the coordinating organ it was meant to be. 
The previous Level One Survey, as it was known, focused only on information about location 
and about the presence of the landmines. The pre-1998 UN definition of the Level One 
Survey and its purpose is as follows: 
The objective of the Level One General Survey is to collect information on the general locations of 
suspected or mined areas. Information must be collected about the areas affected by mines or 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and areas that are not affected. Areas must be categorized and the 
reliability and credibility of data recorded. A Level One General Survey is a prerequisite for the 
planning of a Level Two: Technical Survey (VVAF, 2001).  
Owing to the lack of information on landmine impact, priority for HMA initiatives was set by 
the HMA operator on the basis of criteria like ease of access or the presence of easily visible 
objects of impact such as access to transport infrastructure. Most often, the HMA operator 
established an unranked list of priority tasks they expected to be completed within the coming 
year, this list was sent to the provincial governor, who ranked it by priority. The process was 
carried out by knowledgeable parties with insight into the provincial landmine problem but far 
removed from the reality of community impact, generally using criteria for assessing impact 
reflecting provincial priorities rather than criteria relevant for the community. It was therefore 
clear that the planning potential emerging from the previous data was limited. 
                                                 
11 The HALO trust completed a national landmine survey in 1994 on commission from the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, but the survey was not able to cover the whole country and only 
recorded the position of suspected areas.  
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As the international community became increasingly focused on landmines, during the 1990s, 
funding for the HMA sector grew. After the increase in funding came donor demand, for 
better targeting of resources. There was a need to assess HMA as a part of the development 
sector and to assess the impact of the landmines on the basis of what social and economic 
implications they had for the communities they affected. This led to a new definition of the 
landmine survey with the aim of mapping socio-economic impact of the landmines. The 
following definition was developed by the Survey Working Group (SWG), which is 
constituted by several NGOs as well as relevant UN agencies: 
The ... [Landmine] Impact Survey identifies and maps all suspected mined areas. Socio-economic data, 
victim data, and behavioural data associated with these suspected areas are collected using a variety of 
sources. From this information, rough calculations are made on the general location of suspected mined 
areas and their relative socio-economic importance. This work does not require specialized Demining 
Teams because mined areas are not actually entered. (VVAF, 2001) 
In this definition the focus is moved to the communities as the unit of analysis. The landmines 
themselves are not important, but rather the effect they have on the social context. The choice 
of the closest village to the minefield as the object of study shifts the focus of the information 
gained by the survey towards the daily activities of the people living in the proximity of the 
minefield. The survey will analyse what the social, economic, political and behavioural 
consequences of having a minefield in the vicinity of the village are, as stated in the final 
report from the Mozambique LIS: 
On behalf of the national mine-action authority in Mozambique, the purpose of the Mozambique 
Landmine Impact Survey (“MLIS”) was to collect, record and analyze information on the location of 
known or suspected mined areas throughout the country, and to provide an overview of their social and 
economic impacts as perceived by the residents of landmine-affected communities (CIDC, 2001).  
Not only does the LIS try to gather information and calculate the relative socio-economic 
importance of the landmines, it does so by mapping behavioural data in the suspected areas. 
This focus on behaviour is further emphasised in the Mozambique LIS Final Report, in which 
focus is given to how impacts are perceived by residents, thereby using the analytical capacity 
of the residents to assess impact. This is evident, first, because the survey does not map 
minefields but areas suspected (by the community) to be contaminated with landmines, hence 
mapping the fear of landmines rather than the presence of the weapon itself, and, secondly, 
because the survey records impacts as perceived by local residents, using local knowledge and 
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analysis to enable the community to set the priorities for mine action. Importance is given to 
the local self-definition of impact as opposed to the assessments conducted by HMA 
professionals coming from the outside. 
Table 1. Establish a framework to study the shift from an expert-defined to a community-
defined impact identification. This framework is a foundation for situating the LIS within the 
general shift toward participatory approaches. Power and knowledge is evaluated to illustrate 
the shift from valorising professional realities to valorising community realities.  
 Position within the shift 
 Professional Community 
Power Expert  Participation  
Knowledge Objective information Perceptions 
 Table 1: From professional to community definition of impact 
The survey uses participatory methodology to map the perceptions of impact in the 
community; village residents assemble for a focus group interview, and through a 
participatory assessment approach the aspects of landmine impact are discussed and recorded 
by the survey team. The interview utilises additional analytical tools, including map-drawing, 
historical references, as well as trend and change analysis as methodological tools to enable 
the community to analyse their situation and to convey their analysis to the LIS survey team. 
The LIS survey also encourages additional triangulation of information by collecting data 
from other information sources, although it is a weakness that there are few incentives for 
surveyors to make use of extra information sources in a systematic manner (Benini, 1999). 
The use of group interviews and various participatory techniques enables the LIS to expand 
the analysis of impact despite the limited format of the national survey. Simultaneously, it is 
clear that lack of time does present limitations for the survey, and for the ability to fully map 
all complexities and nuances of community impact. In line with recent re-orientation within 
development theory and policy, the survey allows the community to analyse the landmine 
situation and to take part in setting the priority of mine action, enabling the community to 
define what problems they experience when living with landmines and to take part in 
decisions that affect their own lives. At the same time, the LIS is likely to encounter the same 
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challenges as participatory approaches more generally. The aim of this thesis is therefore to 
study how the survey fits within the shift in development theory and to assess how the 
strengths and weaknesses of participatory approaches are experienced within the specialised 
HMA sector. 
3.4 Concluding remarks  
This chapter has sketched a shift taking place within the theory of development and post-war 
reconstruction as well as within HMA. It is a shift towards valorising local knowledge and 
towards enabling communities to make decisions that affect their own lives. The shift aims at 
adapting assistance to the context and the needs of the local community. The chapter further 
describes the participatory assessment of the LIS survey and how the survey is a part of the 
larger shift toward valorising local knowledge and analysis. Through the survey, the 
community is enabled to analyse the landmine situation themselves, while the role of the 
survey team is limited to facilitating the group discussion and to bring to the foreground local 
knowledge and analysis. There are obvious problems in integrating such participatory data 
into a national survey, but this is not unusual, as more and more development practitioners 
aim to enter participatory data into large-scale questionnaire surveys, using participatory 
analysis tools and focus group responses within a statistical analysis, aiming to achieve the 
best of both worlds by combining qualitative and quantitative methodology. The chapter also 
outlines serious criticism against the participatory approach, questioning the ability to access 
local knowledge and analysis as held by a variety of members of the local communities. The 
following analysis will examine how the LIS survey fits within the shift described throughout 
this chapter, by assessing to what extent the survey is able to bring to the foreground local 
knowledge and analysis as well as to reflect this information in the priorities for mine action. 
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Chapter 4  
The Chifunde Case Study 
This chapter will introduce the case study community of Chifunde and how it is affected by 
the presence of landmines. It will go through the capacities and the vulnerabilities of the 
village, related to the landmine presence, and analyse the impact of these issues in terms of 
the community’s ability to counteract them. This will form a basis for the study of the LIS 
survey, both in terms of how it is able to bring to the foreground local knowledge and analysis 
and in terms of how this knowledge is reflected in the priorities for mine action. As such, this 
analysis will form the basis for the discussion in the two following chapters.  
The presentation of my findings in Chifunde is based on Anderson and Woodrow’s Capacities 
and Vulnerability Analysis structured around the AMAC Community Study methodology 
(Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Harpviken and Millard, 1999). I have chosen to present the 
Chifunde case study in line with this framework because it gives a comprehensive 
representation of the problems facing the village and how these problems are related to the 
presence of the landmines. The framework structures the discussion around three key issues 
analysing how the capacities and vulnerabilities of the community affect its ability to respond 
to the threat posed by landmines. First, the economic field focuses on physical environment 
and access to resources needed for food and economic security. Next, the human field focuses 
on the individual’s sense of threat and the engagement in risk activities despite knowing the 
danger involved, with a primary focus on personal security and health in a wide perspective 
including access to health and education facilities. Last, the social field examines how local 
leadership and social networks are able to deal with vulnerabilities connected to the landmine 
situation. In addition to these three issues I have included a section looking into the priorities 
of the district administration as well as some indications as to why Chifunde was targeted for 
HMA. This section is separated from the general discussion of capacities and vulnerabilities 
because the logic of the argument not only refers to community impact but also looks at 
prospects for district development. The chapter aims at placing the landmine impact in 
context by identifying vulnerable groups within society, by identifying where there are 
systematic differences in landmine affectedness, and by identifying the context of the 
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vulnerabilities, looking at factors that lead to or strengthen the impact as perceived by 
members of the community.  
4.1 Community background 
Chifunde is the district capital of the district with the same name. There are two further 
administrative levels, Administration Post and Local Administration, which also carry the 
name of Chifunde, but these administrative levels will not be used actively in the further 
presentation. The village of Chifunde consists of several bairros but I shall consistently be 
speaking of the administrative centre (the bairro of Chifunde) when referring to Chifunde 
village. The district borders on Zambia and Malawi, and the main road connecting Zambia 
and Tete city runs through the whole district from north to south, although not through the 
district capital. Most of the commercial traffic passes through from Zimbabwe to Malawi and 
further to Tanzania; the road through Chifunde district therefore is mostly used to reduce the 
traffic from the other roads. The result is that the administrative areas adjacent to the border 
with Zambia and Malawi are far bigger than the district capital, which is placed outside the 
main road at the end of a dead end road. The condition of the road to the village of Chifunde 
makes it inaccessible for several months a year, and only recently did the village get a 
permanent bridge, securing a more stable connection to the main road. This inaccessibility has 
made the public services in Chifunde poor and has made the establishment of a permanent 
market impossible. Chifunde village has approximately 446 villagers in 150 huts. Because of 
the population fluctuation it has been difficult to establish the population changes throughout 
the conflict, although the village has clearly grown in comparison with the pre-war period. It 
is the district centre for schools, hospital and police as well as the administrative centre. There 
were two electrical generators, one in the demining camp and one in the District 
Administrators home. The District Administration, hospital and school had no electricity.  
Chifunde was the host of a military camp during the civil war; it therefore became the target 
of heavy fighting and sabotage. During the period from 1990 to 1992 the FRELIMO 
government army laid a defensive minefield along the one side of the village protecting it 
from attacks by the rebel RENAMO forces. Furthermore, the village is situated on a plateau 
with a 5- to 10-meter high cliff, caused by land subsidence, separating the village from the 
riverbanks, on the side not protected by landmines. These two factors created an enclosure of 
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the village which would have made it difficult for it to be attacked (see Appendix C). But as 
the peace settlement was negotiated in Rome in 1992, only a short time after the mines were 
laid, they never had a strategic effect. The military presence was probably as much to protect 
the administrative centre, but Chifunde also had some economic importance as the base for 
some cotton production and a market. Chifunde at this stage had tap water and electricity for 
all houses but also for some of the huts. During the war this infrastructure was destroyed, and 
the village had little ability to preserve the resources, resulting in villagers looting and 
destroying infrastructure for other needs. Now the water pipelines are used as football goals 
and support for the corrugated iron ceilings of buildings such as the teachers’ quarters. The 
war also brought an end to the production of cash crops, and the market never reopened due to 
lack of road access. 
Because of the military presence, Chifunde became a centre for refugees during the war; its 
proximity to the border made it a good transit village on the way to Zambia and Malawi, and 
the military presence guaranteed security for those who wanted to stay on in Mozambique. 
After the peace settlement, several villages were established as support apparatus for the 
repatriation of refugees, and one of these was Chifunde. The villages chosen were close to the 
borders and would function as halfway stops before the refugees returned to their place of 
origin. The use of such repatriation centres functioned as security for the returnees, as they 
could resettle in Mozambique and still keep open the possibility to re-migrate if the peace did 
not prevail (Millard and Harpviken, 2000. p.39). In addition to the transiting migrants, there 
were a lot of refugees from Chifunde to the neighbouring countries of Malawi and Zambia, 
who returned after the war. The refugee situation led to heavy overpopulation of Chifunde 
during and immediately after the war.  
When the war ended and food production started picking up pace, naturally Chifunde could 
not support its increased population. Most of the refugees resettled further inland, returning to 
their place of origin or settling down in new areas of opportunity (Interview, Romao). Due to 
a lack of agricultural possibilities in Chifunde, remaining villagers who were dependent on 
farmland settled in existing or newly established villages surrounding Chifunde, where the 
agricultural land was more readily available. At the time of the fieldwork the situation was 
more stable, and any growth in the size of Chifunde was due to internal growth or 
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immigration owing to the presence of work opportunities within the administration and 
government service, like the school or the health clinic. The issue of land pressure is still not 
resolved, and there are signs of overpopulation, as many people choose to stay in Chifunde 
due to the opportunities and the proximity to government services (Interview, Romao). 
4.2 Economic field 
Chifunde is a community firmly based on subsistence agriculture. Access to land is the single 
most important factor for food security. Simultaneously, lack of, or at least the difficulty in 
obtaining, agricultural land is clearly the most common issue of concern raised during my 
interviews. Chifunde showed a high degree of land concentration, and a considerable social 
stratification was largely based on land access and ownership. The issue of land pressure was 
a result of the history of conflict in terms of the resulting migration to and village growth in 
Chifunde and also the overcultivation and fall in productivity of the agricultural land. Farmers 
were complaining that land available in the village was deteriorating and giving smaller 
yields. This meant that each household needed a bigger plot to sustain the same production. 
As a consequence, tenants were evicted from the plots they had access to.  
The most fertile land, by the riverbanks, was concentrated on the hands of five large 
landowners, referred to as the forefathers because of their central importance in the 
community and their long ties to the village (Interview, Ziambene; Chagaca). Furthermore, 
only villagers with firm ties to the area had land ownership around the village of Chifunde. As 
a result of this, villagers moving to Chifunde, without inherited property rights, were 
struggling to get land, mainly relying on borrowing plots from the biggest landowners. Some 
even leased land, which is a very unusual situation in Mozambique (Interview, Nsigano). I 
identified two categories of people who found it particularly difficult to get access to land: 
immigrants who had settled in Chifunde after the war and the younger generation in need of 
land to support new family formations. Needless to say, the big landowners gave priority to 
friends and relatives.  
The fieldwork coincided with the period of the first rains, when farmers were about to plant 
crops for the coming season. Just prior to my arrival several villagers had been evicted from 
the plots they were borrowing, which left the families in a difficult situation, as clearing a new 
field is tedious and hard work. During the period of my fieldwork there was clearly a lot of 
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anger on the part of people who were newly evicted. This situation might have caused 
informants to exaggerate the importance of agricultural land when talking to me, but it was 
apparent that the scarcity of fertile land did create social problems.  
However, there was no unified agreement that the lack of agricultural land has any impact on 
the village, using a separate logic the impact caused by blockage of land can be seen to be 
negligible. Usually those with adequate land access were quite hostile towards those 
complaining of poor access to land. The main argument was that they were lazy people not 
having the initiative to clear new plots; all they had to do was to move out of Chifunde, where 
there would be plenty of land (Interview, Jalitar; Socossi). It was also suggested that the land 
cleared from the minefield was expected to give poor yields as the drainage was too high and 
the crops were too dependent on continued rain; the land was also said to be depleted from 
previous overcultivation. From a developmental point of view Chifunde would probably not 
have been offered demining solely on the basis of blocked agricultural land, as the economic 
gain of clearing the minefield is very low. The crop grown was rainfed subsistence maize, and 
the economic return on such crops would probably never outrun the cost of demining the land. 
It would be far cheaper to fence the mined area in or simply mark it while moving the entire 
village to another site. There would be dangers involved with these strategies; fencing the area 
would remove the accident potential of the mined area but would not remove the impact of 
the minefield because of the continuing lack of land. Moving the village could upset social 
networks because in this area of Mozambique much of the social networks is linked to the 
land and to land rights (Blom, 2002). Clearly, the magnitude of the conflict in Chifunde 
illustrates how land ownership is linked to family lineage and power.  
Returning to the impact of land blockage I found in Chifunde, the area cleared after the mine 
action will probably resolve many of the conflicts over land which are experienced now, not 
only because the area that was de-mined is large but also because it will open up access to 
areas behind the minefield, situated between the minefield and a small river joining the river 
Luja south of Chifunde. Because of this the total area available for cultivation will be larger 
than the area cleared. If the area is used only for subsistence farming, much of the land 
disputes in the village will probably be resolved. The cleared area will give most villagers 
access to land. At the same time the central landowners in Chifunde claimed that the clearing 
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of agricultural land was important because it would enable them to evict their tenants and 
utilise more of the high quality land for themselves (Group interview, Silverio, Cateia and 
Roniano). Landmine clearance can in this way further strengthen polarisation of a scarce 
resource. This would lead to a further concentration of access to the fertile riverbanks, 
confining others to the less fertile plateau. There is therefore a danger that the freeing of land 
resources through mine clearance might reinforce the polarisation of land ownership and use 
of the high-value agricultural areas by the riverbanks. 
The minefield blocks wood resources, but this is seldom highlighted as a main concern in the 
interviews, although it is seen as inconvenient to go some distance to gather wood for fuel and 
building materials for houses. There is no sale of wood, so this also is strictly for household 
consumption. Villagers were seen to enter the areas cleared by NPA prior to the quality 
assurance and the handing over of the area to the community. This premature utilisation of the 
area can be seen as a sign that the wood resources were important to the community, although 
the villagers collecting wood from the area claimed to have knowledge of the placement of 
the previous minefield and did not consider themselves at risk (Interview, Chagaca; 
Ganizane). 
Livestock generally provide both food and economic security within the household. There 
was no cattle in Chifunde as the tsetse fly makes it impossible to keep large livestock. But 
there were several types of fowl, goats, pigs and other forms of small stock. Some of the 
bigger farmers said that they would slaughter livestock before the planting season. This would 
allow them to go to Tete to buy soap and salt, to serve as payment for labourers who worked 
in their fields. In this way they could sustain larger fields and generate more surplus 
(Interview, Jalitar). There were also accounts of some hunting or poaching, but this did not 
appear to be widespread. Many rely on food sources such as ground rats, locusts, roots and 
fruits as supplements to the diet. As the minefield in Chifunde was clearly marked, livestock 
was easily kept away from the area and there were no reports that landmines influence the 
keeping of livestock or hunting. 
There was no market in Chifunde, and this left few possibilities for farmers to generate any 
income. The closest market would be in one of the two neighbouring districts of Chiuta or in 
Macanga; both of these would probably be a full-day travel – most of the distance by foot, 
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because of the lack of transport. It was therefore considered easier to travel directly to Tete 
city (the provincial capital); although it was a longer journey it would give access to a better 
market. Even though the road to Chifunde was reopened none of the cars that frequented the 
village would take any passengers or be available for the transportation of goods. The 
presence of 30-40 deminers obviously provided a substantial purchasing power, and villagers 
would occasionally visit the camp to sell chickens and eggs and sweet potatoes. But this was 
more the exception than the rule, and the lack of ability to provide sufficient goods for the 
demining platoon resulted in the deminers getting most of their supplies from other markets. 
Given adequate coordination, villagers in Chifunde and the surrounding area could have 
managed to supply the demining camp with sufficient food supplies; such coordination would 
also have aided in the building of local capacities. 
During my fieldwork a tobacco company from Malawi came to Chifunde proposing to supply 
farmers with tobacco seeds, promising to re-buy the tobacco leaves. This was the first year 
they came, and only some farmers engaged in the opportunity, although not all were 
convinced the company would return to buy back the tobacco harvest. Most of the villagers 
were reluctant to try and were anticipating how the first year would turn out. In the 
neighbouring district of Macanga and in the northern part of Chifunde district the production 
of tobacco was quite widespread and probably provided influx of cash to the area. This could 
also be the case for Chifunde when the farmers see the potential for starting production of a 
cash crop, although this is dependent on the establishment of trust that the tobacco company 
would return to buy the resulting crop. The lack of trust toward commercial farming was 
probably due to poor experiences with a Zambian company that came to buy surplus maize 
three years ago. In the surrounding bairros, villagers started producing larger maize crops. 
The company returned for a few years, but in the last few years they had stopped coming. The 
income this had brought to the area had been very welcome. Some were still producing maize 
beyond the needs of the household, in the hope that the company would return. One farmer 
had enough maize to support his family for three years and with no possibility to transport 
produce to market; this constitutes a substantial economic loss (Interview, Jalitar). The older 
villagers remembered the influx of money from the previous production of cotton cash crop, 
and they expressed some optimism toward the presence of the tobacco company, although 
they claimed that the tobacco would destroy the soil and leave it useless, unlike cotton, which 
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was a much better plant. They would therefore have preferred to return to cotton production 
(Interview, Twoboi). The lack of agricultural areas in the village would force those interested 
in tobacco production to venture out of the village to find suitable areas for large-scale cash 
crop production. It was mentioned that the land cleared from the demining could be utilised 
for cash crop production, but generally villagers were anticipating the results of the first year 
of tobacco production before investing time and resources in clearing new fields and starting 
production of cash crops. 
There are four small shops – locally called banca – but during my stay in Chifunde all but one 
were closed due to lack of goods. The three that were closed only sold soft drinks and 
crackers, and when they ran out, they would close until they got new shipments, which were 
generally unpredictable. The fourth banca was larger and sold several products including 
some luxury goods such as tinned food and batteries.  
The government services provided in Chifunde are not very extensive, even by Mozambican 
standards. The district is clearly in need of better services, in education and basic health, but 
the village would also benefit from a more permanent road access. The establishment of 
routine transport facilities would enable the development of a monetary economy and 
possibly even a permanent or semi-permanent market. Much can be done in the way of 
development both for the village of Chifunde and for the district. The position as district 
capital automatically gives Chifunde an urban status, yet it remains a rural community where 
the household security is based on subsistence agriculture. There are only three people living 
in Chifunde who survive solely on a work-related income: the medical assistant, the district 
police chief and district administrator (Interview, Ziambene). There is a small group of 
villagers having sufficient income so they only have to keep a small garden to grow fresh 
maize, some cassava or maybe some groundnuts. But the vast majority have subsistence 
farming as their main livelihood. Even though there are work possibilities connected to the 
administration, there is little use of cash in everyday transactions. Most transactions are based 
on the trade of work for food, salt or soap. Cash will mostly prove important to build up 
economic security through investment in livestock or to pay the maize mill. Importantly, 
economic development is not hindered by the presence of landmines but by the lack of 
investment.  
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To sum up the impact in the economic field, people’s livelihoods in Chifunde are based on 
access to agricultural land, which is also the resource that is blocked. The discussion has also 
touched upon vulnerabilities connected to other factors of basic security like access to wood 
and livestock resources and income security connected with market access and income 
generation. The minefield does affect several of the economic resources touched upon in the 
section, but there do not seem to be the same systematic differences in vulnerability as seen in 
relation to agriculture. The systematic differences in access to agricultural land illustrate the 
importance of achieving broad representation for the participatory information gathering. This 
section has shown that blockage of land does not necessarily constitute an impact for the 
community – in most parts of Mozambique access to land is not a problem – but the historic 
context and the resulting overpopulation, land degradation and the polarisation of land 
ownership in Chifunde have left some groups vulnerable and unable to access sufficient land.  
4.3 Human field  
The villagers reported a general feeling of security, with the threat of landmines being 
reduced over the last few years. The minefield in Chifunde was marked in the end of 1999, 
prior to the mine action operation. Marking the field was seen as an important factor for the 
feeling of security and has reduced the fear connected with movement in the area. The fear of 
landmines is generally limited to the minefield; villagers did not seem to worry when utilizing 
the area around Chifunde. There were tales of landmines in different areas around Chifunde, 
but they proved impossible to verify. This said, there were several reports that landmines were 
seen as a threat; even though villagers considered the landmine problem to be restricted to the 
minefield, they reported a fear connected with landmines as a weapon and a sense of threat 
connected with the minefield. Chifunde is a community where the landmine situation is very 
much normalised in the everyday life of the villagers. 
The only landmine accident that occurred in the village was an incident killing three goats, the 
first year the mines were laid, which was in 1991 (Interview, Socossi; Nguende). The owner, 
Socossi, did not know that the area was mined and had unknowingly let the goats graze in the 
minefield. The accident came at a time when the village was overcrowded with refugees, and 
there was a desperate food shortage. The goats were the only livestock in the village, and the 
sight of the three rotting goats was very demoralising. But the accident was an isolated 
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incident, and landmines were not seen to have any further impact on the keeping of livestock. 
After the incident the livestock was kept at the other side of the village, and there were no 
further victims.  
But there are examples of villagers engaging in risk behaviour out of need. Chagaca is a 
farmer who settled in Chifunde after the war; he moved here because he wanted to stay with 
his relatives after his guardian uncle died.  During my fieldwork he cleared land inside the 
previous minefield. The area had been demined only a few months earlier and had not yet 
been quality-checked and handed over to the community. This premature utilisation caused 
some concern for the demining team, who wanted villagers to delay the use of the area until 
the demining was complete. Previously, Chagaca had borrowed land elsewhere in Chifunde, 
but he was evicted by the landowner just prior to this planting season. At first he was reluctant 
to clear land in the area due to the fear of landmines. But after trying to borrow land from the 
village landowners to no avail, he seemed to have no other choice but to clear land in the 
previous minefield, even though he considered this a last option. The illustration of Chagaca 
is a good example of how people settling in Chifunde have a hard time getting land, 
highlighting the problem caused by polarisation of land ownership.  
Chagaca claims to have knowledge of the placing of the minefield, stating that the minefield 
started just behind where he is now cultivating. Therefore he did not consider himself to be 
clearing within the perimeters of the old minefield. He came to Chifunde in 1993, a period 
when there was still a military presence in Chifunde. The soldiers gave him information about 
the positioning of the minefield. It seems as though the village was given reliable information 
of where the landmines were originally planted. Several villagers knew where and how the 
landmines were positioned. The landmines was planted on each side of big trees stones or 
other objects, in two or three parallel lines running alongside the village. He has also been 
through a mine awareness course organised by the Red Cross. The Red Cross had trained 
three villagers in mine awareness, and most villagers I spoke with had some knowledge of 
landmines, either from the soldiers or from the mine awareness programmes. In addition to 
getting information from the army, Chagaca became confident that the area was free of mines 
after seeing people entering the cleared areas to collect firewood. This was probably why he 
decided to clear land there for agriculture. Several of my respondents stated that they would 
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not have confidence or trust in the work done by the deminers before they saw people using 
the area (Interview, Ganizane; Janiel). This rapid utilisation of the cleared land substantially 
increased the trust in the demining and was an important indication that the land cleared 
would be utilized once the clearing was completed. The fact that Chagaca was using the land 
should also be seen as an indication that the land cleared was of great importance for 
Chifunde.  
The threat posed by the minefield was accentuated by heavy land subsidence on the north side 
of the village, forming a cliff down to the river plane. It was uncertain to what degree the 
subsidence was still active, but several buildings from the colonial period were about to be 
eroded away. The river was meandering some distance from the village, and from my 
interviews and personal observation it was clear that the erosion, was a problem primarily on 
the other side of the river. During the first weeks of rain, there were some signs of further 
subsidence; this was especially visible on the path leading down from the plateau to the 
farmland on the plain by the river. Large blocks of sand were breaking loose and sliding down 
the footpath, indicating that the land subsidence on the plateau had by no means stabilised. 
People living close to the subsidence were naturally very concerned that the subsidence might 
destroy their property and house. Neither the land subsidence nor the minefield would by 
itself have caused a significant feeling of threat, but the combination created an enclosure of 
the village and became a source of insecurity for the people living close to the land 
subsidence (Interview, Luis; Janiel). Similar to the impact of land pressure there seemed to be 
diverging reports of whether there was an impact of the land subsidence. Most other villagers 
were untouched by the impact of the subsidence, and they contested that there was any further 
subsidence, referring to the erosion being a problem for the community on the other side of 
the river. Largely the villagers saw the enclosure as inhibiting village growth and 
development but considered this as a restraint rather than a threat (Interview, Romao; 
Ziambene; District Administrator; Lissene).  
The landmines seemed to have few direct health impacts on the village. There was a health 
post connected to the district administration. This was the only building that survived the war. 
The health post was the base for one medical assistant, who was responsible for running it. He 
also had three medical agents and one lab technician. Beyond primary first aid, there was no 
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capacity to treat landmine victims in case of an accident. In any accident demanding surgery 
or further assistance the victim had to be taken to the provincial hospital in Tete. There was an 
ambulance in the district, but it was shared by the whole district and only occasionally 
frequented the village. The most common diseases treated at the health post were malaria and 
various kinds of throat infections. Malnutrition was also a problem, as people did not have a 
balanced diet. Eggs and non-staple food crops functioned as additional income rather than to 
provide food diversity, and families were often forced to sell them in order to pay for the 
maize mill and the like. There did not seem to be many cases of Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STD) in the Chifunde area, as the village was far from the main road (Interview, 
João).  
The landmines did not impair access to water sources. There are two wells in Chifunde, 
established after the war by an American NGO, and a third one that will be repaired by NPA 
as a part of their Community Services Approach (CSA) to HMA. One of the pumps did have 
slightly salty water, but this did not seem to concern the villagers or the NPA staff, dismissing 
it as adding extra flavour to the water. The NPA also has a project targeting the building of pit 
latrines and the associated health education within their CSA; this also included a theatre 
group coming from Chifunde to perform a play on STD and sex education. In this way NPA 
targeted health-related vulnerabilities of the community extending the scope of the assistance 
to the village.  
The school in Chifunde provides classes up through seventh grade. It is the only school in the 
district which provides this level of education. This results in a problem of housing for the 
boarding pupils, since children come from all over the district to study. Students are often 
dependent on setting up their own accommodation during the stay in Chifunde. For classes 
above the seventh grade students had to go to Tete. Generally, the schools in Mozambique 
provide mine awareness education, but in Chifunde the school did not appear to be the 
primary channel for this kind of information, but rather the Red Cross, as mentioned earlier. 
There seemed to be various ideas as to whether schooling would increase chances of success 
for the children. Even a literate, comparatively well-situated farmer did not see the value of 
sending his children to school, probably because he did not see any opportunities linked to 
education, but would rather focus on a good work morale as a way to gain basic security 
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(Interview, Jalitar). Few would see the needs for formal education in their everyday life, 
although it was seen as an important resource to achieve prosperity and development.   
The population increase in the northern administrative post of Mualadz led to plans of 
expanding both the school and the medical facilities there. This would ease the burden on 
Chifunde for these services, but at the time of my fieldwork Chifunde functioned as the 
district centre for the health and educational services. 
To sum up the impact in the human field, the villagers generally report a feeling of security. 
This feeling of security comes as the community adapt to living with the threat posed by the 
landmines and is strengthened by villagers perceiving the mine treat as being limited to the 
minefield. There are examples of villagers who engage in high-risk behaviour out of need, 
like clearing land in the previous minefield, and also of villagers reporting a sense of 
insecurity caused by the landmine situation – for example, the inability to resettle a household 
away from the land subsidence. The threat posed by the landmines seems to affect vulnerable 
groups in the community, while those who have resources seem able to avoid risk behaviour. 
This is especially visible in relation to the access to agricultural land, but is equally true for all 
vulnerabilities. 
4.4 Social field 
Chifunde did not have the dual leadership structure found in many other parts of Mozambique 
(Alexander, 1997: Blom, 2002; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999). After the decolonisation, 
FRELIMO took the rule of government, banned all use of traditional leadership systems and 
built their own administrative hierarchy. The traditional leadership was seen to conflict with 
FRELIMO’s egalitarian Marxist view and had been used within the administrational 
structures of the colonial state. When RENAMO started their offensive against the FRELIMO 
government, they were in needed of an administrative structure, and therefore re-established 
these traditional leadership systems and used them for administrative purposes in their areas 
of control. FRELIMO’s inability to completely remove traditional leadership structures has 
therefore led to the presence of dual leadership in many parts of Mozambique (Blom, 2002).  
Because Chifunde was an administrative centre and had a strong FRELIMO dominance, the 
traditional structures had lost all influence. When the mfumo (traditional leader) of Chifunde, 
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mfumo Chafuzika, died in 1969, four years after independence, none of his kin was reinstated 
to fill his place (Interview, Romao; Chafuzika). Most of his lineage either died or did not 
return from exile after the war. There was a nephew living in Chifunde at the time of my 
fieldwork, but there had been no initiative to reinstate him. Although some spoke of 
Chafuzika as an mfumo he held no position as a leader and was mostly seen as an herbalist. 
Importantly, he did not consider himself a leader and said that society had found other ways to 
fill the position of the mfumo. As such there is no apparent conflict between the traditional 
leadership systems and the state apparatus in Chifunde.  
The traditional duties of the mfumo were carried out by the secretary of the bairro, or by the 
police or were settled privately. There was also a president who was locally elected and had 
responsibility for all the six bairros in the local administration, and whose functions 
overlapped those of the previous mfumo. The FRELIMO Party was still dominant in the 
village, and this was clearly a major reason why there had been little demand for the 
reinstatement of a new mfumo. The local administration was generally considered legitimate.  
The secretary for the bairro is the primary point of contact for the villagers of Chifunde, but 
not all are comfortable with his position. The village secretary of Chifunde was very young; 
this is a clear disadvantage in this part of Mozambique, as respect for a leader is also a 
function of age12 (West and Kloeck-Jenson, 1999). One respondent stated that the local leader 
was incompetent and mocked his ability to settle disputes. This was clearly the exception 
rather than the rule, but I did get the impression that, although situated in an administrative 
centre, not all villagers are comfortable with using the administrative structures for support or 
conflict resolution (Interview, Chima). 
Settling disputes over land and land distribution was traditionally the responsibility of the 
mfumo. When I asked my interviewees where they would go to ask permission to open a new 
garden for cultivation, their answers would range from going to the district administration, the 
agricultural officer, the secretary of the bairro, the president, the person owning the land, or 
                                                 
12 During my fieldwork I met several mfumos and local leaders who were very young. The politicised nature of 
the local leadership left them a target for both parties to the war. After the peace settlement many local leaders 
were either dead or did not return from exile. This has led to the instatement of young, inexperienced local 
leaders who had problems achieving the respect needed to perform in the mediating positions they were given. 
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the person owning the adjacent land to not asking anybody before clearing the land. This is a 
clear indication that in the absence of a traditional leader with clear responsibility for settling 
land disputes there is now a responsibility vacuum. In case of land shortage most villagers 
request land from the landowners in the village. In this way landowners have taken over the 
traditional responsibility of the mfumo and have become responsible for land distribution. 
There were still systems of land inheritance and distribution of land through kinship, but 
because of the present lack of land for redistribution, young people about to settle into new 
family formations complain of insufficient access to land through family channels (Interview, 
Janeiro; Nguende).  
The anarchy with regard to land distribution clearly caused much anger, or at least irritation. 
Clearly, this lack of clear authority might cause confusion and be a potential issue of conflict 
when the mined area is cleared and ready for use. Importantly, only one of the villagers I 
spoke to had knowledge of land ownership within the minefield, and it was generally thought 
that the land cleared would benefit all who had need for land on a first-come basis. In that 
case, the land that was cleared would not benefit any single villager, but would benefit anyone 
in need of better access to land. It remains a problem, however, that no procedure for 
distributing land had been discussed or agreed upon prior to clearance.  
There were six churches in or in the vicinity of Chifunde. The biggest one was the Roman 
Catholic Church, which could boast 86 baptised members, and the estimate for the number of 
members was as high as 100, all included. The activity increased when the priest came for a 
sermon every year or two. When I visited a Sunday mass, there were five churchgoers; when 
they saw me coming they postponed the sermon to gather more people. It should be added 
that this was in the middle of the planting season, which could have reduced participation. 
There are only a few signs of collective mobilization. The different churches are, however, all 
built by collective activity. There seems to be a high political engagement in the village, and 
the FRELIMO party is very strong, with a permanent secretariat and active party members. 
Despite this there seems to be little sign of the network being used for the collective good. 
To sum up the impact of the social factors, the fact that there is only one set of local 
leadership is a resource to the community, simplifying decision making and avoiding loyalty 
conflicts. It also simplifies the issue of what entry point the LIS survey should use when 
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coming to the community. There are indications that the elimination of the traditional 
leadership system has left a responsibility vacuum with regard to certain issues, especially the 
distribution of agricultural land. This might be part of the reason why the community 
experiences social conflicts and why land ownership has become polarised.  
4.5 Administrative concerns and district impact 
This section presents the logic behind why the Chifunde administration requested demining 
and why NPA and the provincial governments decided to engage in mine action in Chifunde. 
I have isolated this from the community analysis because there is a different kind of logic 
behind the descriptions of impact given through the community interviews. The section 
illustrates the diversity in the understanding of landmine impact.  
There was no impact assessment prior to the decision to conduct mine action in Chifunde; the 
decision was based on a joint agreement between NPA and the provincial government that 
Chifunde would be a valid target for mine action. Two main arguments could have formed the 
basis for targeting Chifunde for mine action, not considering local impact. First, the district 
administration had received an evaluation from an outside consultant to relocate the village 
because land subsidence was threatening one side of the village, and second, there were 
prospects for promoting Chifunde as a node of economic development. Most likely, these two 
elements were seen as interconnected. 
During the interviews with the district administrator he gave much attention to the issue of 
land subsidence. His fear was that the subsidence would eat its way into the village and force 
villagers to expand the housing area into the minefield. This observation resulted from an 
expert opinion given to the district administration ten years ago. The district administration 
therefore wanted to resettle one half of the village as well as expand government services in 
the newly cleared area. This might also have been the argument of NPA and the provincial 
government for choosing to set up a demining operation in Chifunde; it was at least given as 
one of the reasons for demining by the leader of the demining platoon that worked in 
Chifunde at the time of my study (Interview, Bande).  
More probably, the province administration and NPA gave importance to the fact that 
Chifunde is a district capital when they chose to target the minefield. Economically, to invest 
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in and expand the infrastructure in the district capital could be seen as a tool to promote 
economic growth; if the district capital became a node of economic growth, this could radiate 
out to the rest of the district. In this sense investing in mine action in the district centre could 
lead to general growth in the district. Chifunde would therefore be a natural target for mine 
action, and the implications would hopefully have far greater effects than for the village itself. 
The district administrator presented a vague but ambitious restructuring plan, indicating, the 
digging of wells, and the construction of schools and several other official facilities. 
Unfortunately, he lacked any probable plan for funding such a large-scale operation. With the 
study of the social structure in Chifunde one may also predict a further difficulty in 
implementing the village development plan, as few villagers consult with the district 
administration prior to building a new house or clearing new agricultural land. One example 
of this is the fact that the district administrator stated that nobody would be allowed to settle 
in the newly cleared area without the permission of the administration and in accordance with 
the planned resettlement scheme, while at the same time 200 meters from his office the first 
farmland was being established in the cleared area. Villagers are likely to establish their own 
patterns of settlement due to lack of state penetration of the decision making.  
4.6 Concluding remarks 
The minefield surrounding Chifunde affects the community in several ways, and it is a good 
example of how landmines affect all aspects of a community and all parts of daily life for 
individuals. Chifunde was affected by lack of access to resources for basic security, most 
importantly access to agricultural land but also to non-agricultural resources like wood and 
building materials. It was affected in terms of personal security through the need to venture 
into unsafe territories to collect firewood or clear agricultural fields but also in terms of lack 
of space to build houses in a safe distance from the land subsidence. The village in part also 
lacks the capacity to counteract the vulnerabilities caused by the minefield, as local leadership 
had not been able to resolve conflicts over land ownership. Finally, both the village as well as 
the district were affected by the lack of developmental opportunities for Chifunde, most 
importantly the need for village development, including economic growth and expending 
government services.  
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The chapter has illustrated how perceptions of impact vary with the capacities and 
vulnerabilities of the individual. Some villagers reported vulnerabilities relating to access to 
land or to effects of the land subsidence. Villagers not affected by these vulnerabilities 
generally contested that they had impact on the community; it was also clear that 
vulnerabilities were overcome by villagers who had access to resources. The landmines had 
few impacts that affected the whole community uniformly; exceptions would be the blockage 
of fuel wood or the obstacles to expansion through the village enclosure. Generally, the 
impacts of landmines affect groups within the community and depend on the situation of the 
individual. It is possible to live in Chifunde without being affected by landmines to any 
substantial degree, but it is also equally true that landmines affect the lives of many people in 
Chifunde. The fieldwork showed that the respondents report the impact they themselves 
experience. Villagers not affected by a vulnerability will not report the issue as having any 
impact, because for them it does not. This highlights the importance of the group interview 
because it is able to access a representative sample of group participants, and the importance 
of studying whether the group interviews tend to reproduce the views of its most influential 
members.  
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Chapter 5  
The LIS Mozambique Use of Participation  
This chapter analyses the extent to which the participatory method utilised by the LIS survey 
is able to bring to the foreground local knowledge and analysis, as held by a variety of 
members of the community. The chapter will look at the particular techniques used by the LIS 
survey as well as the general methodological framework emerging from the participatory 
approach, first by examining the choice of informants and secondly by examining the group 
dynamics during the survey interview. The two discussions are rooted in the presentation of 
participatory approaches in chapter 3 and relate directly to the two main criticisms raised 
there: the power-centred critique and the knowledge-centred critique. The analysis in this 
chapter is guided by the two key questions: first, who is participating in the group interviews? 
Secondly, to what extent is the survey able to yield reliable data, in the sense of reflecting the 
locally perceived impact pf landmines? 
5.1 Participation and representativity in the Mozambique LIS survey 
The previous chapter presented some issues of systematic differences in how landmines affect 
the community of Chifunde, highlighting the importance of achieving a representative sample 
of informants in the group interview. This section will assess to what extent the LIS was able 
to achieve broad representation in the survey interviews, partly by discussing the survey as a 
whole but particularly by looking at the case of Chifunde.  
Problems of access constitute the most obvious hinder for the survey team during the 
operational phase of the survey. Access has traditionally implied physical access to village 
areas, available evacuation routes and logistical needs and restrictions. I would argue that 
access is not just a matter of physical availability, which is important to carry out the survey, 
but, more important, it also entails social access and the access to information, which is vital 
for a successful survey. I want to focus on how access to informants through local leaders is a 
prerequisite for the survey, and how difficulty in diversifying the use of these gatekeepers can 
lead to lack of representativity. It is important to understand that societies that are exposed to 
armed conflict also experience a reduction in general trust; this can have implications for 
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willingness to participate and render information to outside organisations (Millard et al. 
2002). Gatekeepers and social access determine the choice of informants. To get access to a 
village, the survey team must approach, and get acceptance from, one of the local leaders; in 
the case of Chifunde this was the village secretary (the secretary of the bairro). If the village 
does have a landmine problem, the survey team will introduce the LIS survey and ask the 
local leader to assemble a group for a survey interview. By assembling the interview the local 
leader will function as a gatekeeper, regulating the composition of the group interview 
(Goode, 2000). In most cases the village representative will respond to the request of the LIS 
survey teams and assemble a group of participants in accordance with the stated requirements. 
The implicit problem is that the composition of the group might also reflect the network and 
the position of the village gatekeeper.  
5.1.1 Composition of the Chifunde group interview 
In Chifunde I found survey participants to represent a small segment of the village, which the 
village secretary thought would have information about the issue in focus, namely landmines. 
The village secretary assembled the group in a way he thought would satisfy the survey 
requirements for local expertise about landmines and local history (Interview, Ziambene). 
Interviews during the follow-up community study showed that, of the fifteen participants. all 
had long familial roots in the area and all were landowners. Moreover, all were active 
FRELIMO party members, but only a few of them were there because of this affiliation 
(Interview, Ganizane). One woman was the leader of the OMM “Organisation for 
Mozambican Women” (Interview, Nsigano). One was there as a mobilisadores de minas (a 
counselling position for mine awareness), and two were secretaries for different bairros. One 
was an information worker for the socially disadvantaged for the Mozambican Red Cross13. 
The three biggest landowners in the village were present, and two high-ranking FRELIMO 
party members (Interview, Chagaca; Janeiro; Ganizane; Nsigano). After the interview the 
interviewer commented that he thought the group was assembled on the basis of their 
knowledge of landmines, and he proved to be right. In an interview Ziambene, the one who 
called the interview, said that he had made an effort to gather the elders who had fought in 
both the colonial wars, against the Portuguese and the civil war against RENAMO. He also 
                                                 
13 Recorded as hvaing these affiliations in the survey interview. 
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said that they were invited because of their knowledge of landmines. But, in addition to 
having expert knowledge about landmines and having good knowledge of the history of 
Chifunde, their long familial roots in the area meant that all participants had easy access to 
resources and were all central actors in the community. On checking through the list of 
participants I found no representatives from vulnerable groups like landless farmers or 
immigrants, or other groups that fall outside the traditional kin-based support structures.  
Another observation concerned who took active part in the interview. Most markedly, all 
three of the young women taking part left halfway through the LIS group interview, leaving 
the men and the older women to complete the group interview. This is understandable, as the 
younger women have more responsibilities at home caring for children, cooking and also 
tending the fields. They often have less time to spare and might get the feeling that it is not 
their place to speak in this type of gathering14. 
5.1.2 Representation in the survey 
During the period I accompanied the Mozambique LIS survey there were several examples in 
which power relations seemed to be a factor determining participation. This was apparent in 
one village visited by the survey team, where the village headman did not let the survey team 
make the confirmation rounds without his presence15. In addition, the schoolteacher dismissed 
his class to serve as our interpreter. This placed us in the company of the two most influential 
people in the village to help us confirm the negative site. The village leader led us past the 
first houses and directly to the biggest house in the area; the house had glass windows and a 
nicely decorated door, was newly chalked, and altogether had a standard I have not seen 
elsewhere in rural Mozambique16. From the base of that house the rest of the participants were 
handpicked and gathered to confirm the landmine situation in the area. There were no women 
among the group, and there was no doubt that the fact that the informants had been 
handpicked gave preference to relatively wealthy middle-aged male farmers. 
                                                 
14 Observations October 13th, 2000 
15 Observations October 24th, 2000; For every negative site found by the survey team, five separate sources have 
to confirm the finding that the village is mine-free. This is not an example of a village with landmine presence 
but illustrates power relations connected with the use of gatekeepers. 
16 Observations October 24th, 2000 
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There were also indications that women were less frequently used as informants than men in 
the survey. Usually women conduct many of the tasks associated with high-risk behaviour, 
like farming and getting water, although most men are injured due to the activity of clearing 
land. Because different genders have different responsibilities, they will differ in their 
perceptions of the landmine threat, making both genders equally important as informants. 
Another aspect of why women should be valued as informants is the matrilinearity in the 
region. Women usually stay in one place all their life, while men move to the village of the 
new wife. In this way the family name and the land ownership pass through the eldest 
daughter but are “controlled” by the eldest son (Blom, 2002). In this system the woman 
carries the continuity and the familiarity to the area both through her familial relation to it and 
her everyday use of the area17. This suggests that women represent a most valuable source of 
information. At the same time they might be less frequently used for the gathering and the 
confirmation of data. In the area of Mozambique I visited, men hold a central position within 
the household. When approaching a family group one automatically addresses the head of the 
household; in Tete this is usually the husband or the brother of the eldest wife. If none of 
these are present, the survey team will ask the women present. In one case we came to a 
cluster of houses where two family groups had gathered for the evening18. Naturally, the two 
heads of households were asked to confirm the information we had gathered about the 
landmine situation. After they had been asked, their wives could not be used to confirm the 
data, due to familial relations. By the kitchen there was a woman alone with some children; I 
do not know whether she was with either family group; she was standing some distance away. 
As she was not standing with any men, she could be asked. If she had been asked about her 
familial relations she might not have been eligible as an informant; had there been men 
present, she could not answer. In this way women have a much higher threshold for being 
used as informants in the survey.  
                                                 
17 Due to massive population displacement, particularly in Tete, many of these traditions are now disintegrating. 
When resettling after the war people have moved to new areas; the consequence of this displacement can cause 
inherited knowledge of an area to be lost. 
18 Observations October 25th, 2000 
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5.1.3 The power of participation 
These observations are entirely expected based on the power of participation, as described in 
the power-centred critique (Kothari, 2001). The group interview in Chifunde did represent 
those with vested interests, excluding those who were marginalized. This was expected 
because those with resources have higher incentives for participating, strengthening and 
conveying their view of reality both to the facilitating organisation and to the group itself. 
Vulnerable groups were excluded because the gatekeeper considered local expert opinion and 
landmine knowledge to be more relevant to the survey than the perceptions held by a variety 
of actors within the community, thereby giving preference to local elites rather than to the 
marginalized. It is, however, difficult to ascertain whether vulnerable groups were reluctant to 
participate, on the basis that they expected village elites to manage the process, or whether 
they failed to see any benefits resulting from their participation. But the observation that the 
young women left during the interview might indicate that this group found they had a 
secondary role in the interview.  
If attention is not given to the composition of the group interview and the role of the 
gatekeeper, the group interview might become an arena that strengthens the existing power 
constellations. The use of village leaders as gatekeepers can disguise power polarisation and 
social inequalities, portraying village needs as uniform to the outside organisation. Attention 
must therefore be given to how the gatekeepers are chosen and whether there is a possibility 
of combining and diversifying points of entry so as to assemble group interviews to make 
them more representative.  
Within local communities in Mozambique it is possible to find parallel local leadership 
structures, each having a separate base of loyalty. The village leadership will give legitimacy 
to the interview and ensure that the participants are comfortable with their role in it. Without 
this approval of the village leader most villagers would be reluctant to attend the interview. 
Villagers see representation as a task for the village leader. Engaging in interviews with 
outside NGOs without his consent will therefore be considered “jumping rank” and taking the 
place that is meant for the village leader. It is therefore customary to direct all inquiries to the 
village head. The need to work through village representatives in Mozambique poses 
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considerable methodological problems19. Use of traditional versus party and state 
administrative structure is very much politicised, and the structures in place today are the 
product of a prolonged conflict in which the different parties used different administrative 
channels to gain cooperation from and control over the population. Because the issue of 
village leadership is so politicised, it is possible to find fractions of the village supporting one 
village leader and disregarding another (Millard and Harpviken, 2001). How village 
leadership is used would depend on the conflict history in the locality and the degree to which 
the leadership systems have been an issue of dispute. Millard and Harpviken found that;  
In Mpucuta, the number of people who attended the opening meeting was considerably small.  It was 
later explained to us by the Secretary that when he called a meeting people tend not to come because his 
request was invalid without the endorsement of the Regulo20.  In Mpucuta this is believed to be related 
to the fact that the majority of the population support the RENAMO party and hence have more affinity 
to the Regulo system, than to the government leadership structure. (Millard and Harpviken, 2001: 59) 
This shows the importance of considering the use of gatekeepers, and that the choice may 
very well influence the composition of the group interview. Using village representatives 
haphazardly as gatekeepers might therefore exclude segments of the population (Millard and 
Harpviken, 2001). There are many local adaptations in the local leaderships; even though the 
positions might carry the same name, they might have different functions varying from place 
to place. This is much due to disruptions in the lineage of traditional leaders and frequent 
changes in the local leaderships as a result of the war (Blom, 2002). There will often be two 
or more parallel leadership structures, and how they share responsibilities may be a product of 
the historical development, the conflict situation in the area or personal qualities of the 
individual leaders (Millard and Harpviken, 2001).  
This obviously complicates the process of quickly being able to distinguish between local 
leaders and utilise those “most appropriate”. This choice of gatekeepers can have an 
unpredictable effect on the group composition (Green and Hart, 1999 p.31).  Indeed, there 
might not be a most appropriate choice; this will depend on the position of the gatekeeper and 
                                                 
19 See section 4.4 Social factors 
20 Traditional leader referred to as mfumo in the Chifunde community study  
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the cannels he uses to engage and mobilise participants. The village probably has to be 
accessed through several gatekeepers simultaneously to ensure better representativity. 
5.1.4 Representativity or local expert opinion 
The issue of who is included in the interview is important only if one can expect different 
results from different informants. Local experts can provide valuable information if they are 
chosen because of their good knowledge of a special subject area. Within development 
thinking there is a common assumption that the community does not have expertise on 
individual subject areas (Chambers, 1997), but the group interview in Chifunde managed to 
produce a substantial number of participants with special knowledge about landmines. The 
participants in the interview had firm knowledge of the issue of landmines, local history, mine 
awareness, and other relevant matters. If you need to know about mine awareness or the 
history of the area, this would be the group most suitable for the interview.  
On the other hand, the focus group’s knowledge of landmines does not imply that it had the 
information needed to show all the ways the landmines affect the community. It is important 
to understand that the group participants are not there to show their knowledge of landmines 
but must reflect the variety of perceptions concerning problems caused by landmines; this 
needs broad representation, not expert knowledge. In Chifunde I found that the group 
interviewed for the LIS survey did have a different view of the landmine problem than other 
people I spoke with21. For example, the group interview was composed of people with 
property rights to the farmland and very strong ties to the area; in contrast, the resettled 
migrants from Zambia and Malawi were having trouble getting land. The result was that the 
landmine impacts presented by the landless farmers were very different from the impact 
described by the LIS group interview. This was again different from the impact presented by 
the local administration and the agricultural officer.  
Through my correspondence with the CIDC I entered into a discussion of whether the 
problems in the group composition would lead to variations in impact identification. The 
question was raised whether personal experience was the only way to acquire information 
about landmines and landmine contamination, or whether this information could be obtained 
                                                 
21 I will return to the description what impacts were recorded for Chifunde in Chapter 6. 
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though conversation and discussion, the point being that factual information of this nature will 
spread to all parties22. Clearly, this would indicate that the most knowledgeable informants 
would render the best-quality information, and that the quality of the data will only depend on 
whether there are imperfections in the flow of information. Restrictions on the movement 
patterns of women might function as a disadvantage for them as informants, whereas 
shopkeepers might be in a privileged position in terms of information gathering, as people 
might choose to gather by the local shop for a late afternoon tea and give tales of the 
encounter of a strange object. Therefore the survey team would do wisely in collecting 
informants who have a firm knowledge of the surrounding area, of history and of other 
relevant matters, as they would be better suited to fill in the blanks in the survey 
questionnaire. 
This scenario fits well with the interview situation and the information gathering I witnessed 
in Chifunde. The participants had firm knowledge of the issue of landmines, local history, 
mine awareness, and other relevant matters and they had long ties to the village and area. As 
we shall see, however, the LIS interview recorded incorrect information and had problems 
picking up variations in the socio-economic impacts of the village. Therefore, my finding of 
impact differentiation within Chifunde is a good illustration of the importance of achieving 
representativity in the group interviews. The participants in the group interview did have 
information and insights of interest to the interview but they were also unaffected by some 
types of impact. The insights held by the participants only represented one part of the picture 
needed to gain knowledge of socio-economic impact. The survey was looking not only for the 
historical context of the landmines but also for the perceptions of how they affected the 
community. 
Not being able to get a representative group is significant to the survey; because villagers 
perceive the threat of landmines differently, they will give diverging presentations of how 
landmines affect their lives. The representation of all parties and the mapping of all impacts 
will undoubtedly increase the quality of the survey. Simultaneously, it is important to 
recognise that landmines tend to affect those lacking resources (McGrath, 2000). The possible 
                                                 
22 This is an important discussion as the GLS LIS surveys, unlike the Mozambique LIS, rely on local expert 
opinion as the basis for their group interviews. 
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exclusion of these groups might cause the survey to lack certain important aspects of the 
social and economic impact of landmines in Mozambique. Because the impacts of landmines 
differ for different groups in society, the locality must not be simplified but must be treated as 
a complex arena where disputes over reality are fought out. If conscious high-risk behaviour 
continues because of need, it also follows that resourceful people will have a better chance to 
avoid high-risk situations (McGrath, 2000). This was also illustrated through the Chifunde 
case study and highlights the need to achieve representation also from vulnerable groups. 
Because some were not heard in the interview, the LIS team lost valuable insights into the 
landmine problem in the village, and the representation of the impact of landmines in 
Chifunde became skewed. 
5.2 Group dynamics and access to local realities  
The second question posed by this chapter aims to look at the extent to which the survey 
generates reliable data through its use of participatory group interviews. The group dynamics 
of the interviews is both a reflection of the methodology chosen by the LIS survey and a 
reflection of how the participants experience the survey setting. More specifically, this section 
focuses on the extent to which the LIS survey is able to build trust in the survey process and 
effectively transfer power to the participants in order to facilitate the group impact analysis, or 
whether the participants in the group interviews adapt their responses in accordance with their 
perception of the external organisation, as this is reflected in the focus of the interview.  
5.2.1 Trust and access to information  
The concept of trust can be valuable to describe the interaction between the survey team and 
the respondents. The lack of trust is important methodologically because it has effects on the 
collection of the data and on the validity of the data. The level of trust in a community might 
be influenced by the previous conflict; specifically, the level of generalised trust might be 
reduced, affecting how the community interacts with outside organisations in post-conflict 
situations (Millard et al., 2002). This lack of trust toward outside institutions and 
organisations might deter villagers from participating in the group interview or can result in a 
reluctant engagement.  
Many of my observations relate to the fact that the LIS survey team has difficulty building 
trust during the brief encounters they have with the communities. The fact that the survey 
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team introduces itself as working on a database for the Mozambican government can still 
cause reluctance to participate many places in Mozambique. During one LIS interview a 
respondent was willing to give information for the survey but was reluctant to let his name be 
recorded23. This demonstrates that there is still a lot of mistrust toward outside initiatives. The 
final report of the Mozambique LIS found that there were several villages who refused to take 
part in the survey (CIDC, 2001). This is not a general problem, and only seldom is the survey 
team denied permission to carry out their job. But the survey only records the incidents where 
informants or villages refuse to participate, while reluctance or hesitation to participate is not 
recorded. All lack of trust affect the group dynamics and can lead to participants adapting 
their response in accordance with their perception of the outside organisation. The survey 
needs to build relations with the community and an understanding of why this information is 
important and how it can help the village, and the more trust, the better chance of obtaining 
good information.   
It is important to note that the survey team, even though Mozambican, is distant from the 
setting of the rural countryside. The survey team will ultimately be perceived as highly 
educated and formally dressed youths arriving in the village from outside. They also come 
driving in a big white car, and they are not able to communicate in the local language. As I 
carry the same characteristics, their alienation is in many ways similar to mine. I do believe 
that being regarded as an “outsider” is not only a product of skin colour. Nor is trust a set 
quantity; it increases as the LIS is able to build an understanding of the survey goals. It takes 
time to build trust, and, it is difficult to achieve trust in the short time span of a survey 
interview.  
5.2.2 Participatory aspects of the LIS 
Chambers (1995; 1997) uses the image of handing over the stick to illustrate how power 
relations within the group interview should be levelled out to generate an arena suitable for 
defining, analysing and presenting the community insights into a specific field. The group 
interview situation in itself is ideal for reducing such difference in power. By building trust 
and reducing the differences in power, the participatory method and the group interview will 
                                                 
23 Observations 24th, October 2000. 
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enable the community to collectively identify the impact of the landmines and suggest how 
the issue should be tackled. By levelling out issues of power, the LIS survey will be seen as 
an institution the group works with to define the situation, and the survey team will have 
participated in a community activity of identifying landmine impact. But if differences in 
power are not levelled out, the LIS survey will be perceived as an outside organisation 
evaluating whether or not the village is eligible for mine action, in this case the village would 
do wisely in trying to adapt their response, to achieve the best solution for themselves. The 
LIS would then be perceived as an institution the village was working toward, and the group 
interview becomes a negotiation for resources. These two settings will yield very different 
answers with regard to landmine impact. When confronted by an external delegation, any 
village would send their top guns to give an impression that would be favourable for the 
village, sending the people who are expected to represent the village in the best way. Usually 
this means that the better-off men would be favoured. The interview becomes a place of 
negotiations over whether, and what type of assistance the village can get and whether it 
deserves it.  
The interview situation I experienced during my time with the LIS survey took more the form 
of a teacher talking to a classroom24. The interviewer and the recorder stood in front of the 
group while the participants were seated around. The maps are drawn on a board, which the 
interviewer set up before the interview was called. The interviewer and the translator in 
conjunction control the conversation. This approach maintains a clear distinction between the 
LIS survey team and the participants and acts to preserve the traditional power relation that is 
usual during such information gathering. As a result, there was little of the internal discussion 
that would bring forward the complexities of the issues that were discussed. The conversation 
was not within the group but rather between the group and the interviewer. The information 
obtained took the form of a brainstorming that resulted in a listing of the blockages, rather 
than a discussion in which the group could analyse the community situation. In the Chifunde 
interview none of the participants put forth objections or introduced topics that could initiate a 
further discussion and bring out contrasting insights into the understanding of landmine 
impact.  
                                                 
24 Observations 13th October 2000 
 73
During the interview the group took on the part of “diplomats” for the region. It is 
understandable that they assume this position, as they already hold central positions in the 
village and the surrounding area. This observation, however, was not recorded in the 
interview by LIS survey25. There was little to indicate what position they held in the 
community or how this would influence their responses. But the positions of the participants 
and the dynamics within the group interview affected the responses given by the participants, 
as they adapted their responses to the focus of the survey.  
5.2.3 Adapted response to survey focus  
The first example of how the group chose to give an adapted response was when they were 
asked the question, “How many people fled from this place during the war?”26 The answer 
given was 5000. This is an impossibly high number, considering the size of the village. This 
is the total number of people living in the sub-district of Chifunde today; in the village of 
Chifunde there are about 446 people. There are, however, several factors that can explain why 
the number given to the survey team was inflated. During the confrontations between 
RENAMO and FRELIMO, Chifunde became a transit centre for Internally Displaced People 
(IDP’s) and a halfway stop on the way to Malawi and Zambia, but most were transiting 
refugees. This was a natural function considering it was an administrative centre and the site 
of a FRELIMO army base. Notably, the question posed by the LIS survey team was, “how 
many villagers fled from Chifunde” and not, “how many refugees transited through the area”. 
Because of the inflated number it is unclear which of these questions the participants 
answered. The LIS survey does not have any way of registering how many of the refugees 
were IDP’s passing through the village. If the respondents include the number of IDP’s 
passing through a village, the number can be expected to increase cumulatively the closer the 
surveyed village is to the borders of the country. And the number will reflect how close the 
                                                 
25 All of the participants were recorded as having farming as their main source of income in the questionnaire. 
There were two exceptions, who were recorded as having other forms of work; still, these two were also 
primarily farmers. They were recorded working as a counsellor for mine awareness and as an information worker 
for the socially disadvantaged for the Mozambican Red Cross. 
26 The question is an example of how historical data are used to triangulate information within the survey; it does 
so by using information about conflict history to support information about the landmine situation. The question 
is not used in the calculation of landmine impact.  
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village is to the border, not the previous conflict situation in the village. Another possible 
explanation is connected to the absence of data on the previous refugee situation. Lack of 
numerical data means that the information provided by respondents may not reflect the actual 
number of people who passed through or fled from the village but rather reflect the perception 
that the number was large (considering 5000 to be a considerable number). 
A second example of how the group adapted the response to fit the focus of the survey 
interview was during the report of mine accidents involving livestock. The group interview 
reported that 55 goats were killed by landmines during the past two years; this was not the 
case. In the village no goats had been killed during the past two years, although there had 
been one incident, in which three goats had been killed, the first year the mines were laid, in 
1991. The time limitation of the question to two years preceding the survey is set to avoid 
mapping these singular landmine incidents and target communities that experience continued 
accident potential. Communities adapt to the landmine situation; Chifunde adapted by moving 
the livestock to the other side of the village, reducing the impact and ensuring that there were 
no more accidents.  
A third example of adapted responses was during the individual questions recording 
perceptions of landmine impact. Before starting the interview, a young man blurted out, in 
Portuguese, that there was no problem with regard to the landmines in the village. He received 
no response, and the interviewer continued giving his introduction of the survey. After 
rounding up the interview, about two and a half hours later, the participants were asked, one 
by one, “Are you concerned about the landmines in your village?”, “Do the landmines affect 
your behaviour?” and “Is your concern stronger or less strong than earlier?”. All participants 
in the Chifunde interview responded that the impact was very strong, more so now than 
previously and that their behaviour was strongly affected by landmines. Even the young man 
who had been very sure that the village did not have a problem with landmines was now very 
much concerned about mines, and his behaviour was very much affected by them. The second 
group interview conducted during my LIS study reported no impact of the minefield; 
nevertheless, the responses to the individual questions were similar to those seen in Chifunde. 
The mines had a high impact during individual questioning.  It seemed as though the 
respondents did not feel free to reply independently, but replied what they thought was 
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expected. If the responses to the individual questions follow this trend, the questions become 
worthless and will not give any information about the impact of the landmines on the 
community. I do not believe that the questions themselves are leading, but they have 
unfortunate results because of the group dynamics.  
There might be several reasons for these responses; I can only assume that they fall into one 
of the following categories: reflection about the impact of landmines during the interview, 
courtesy towards the interviewer and reluctance to “disappoint”, or adapted response to the 
situation at hand. The group interview might have given the group time to reflect on the 
impact of landmines. The fact that the view of the impact of the landmines changed so rapidly 
during the interview is clearly a result of an increased consciousness about landmines. People 
do not live in constant fear since the landmines are contained and clearly marked, and the 
situation is normalised into everyday actions. But this does not mean that the mines do not 
have a social or economic impact. In this sense the consciousness is not new but is just 
triggered when the respondents are given time to elaborate. However, the interview lasted 
about two and a half hours, and the mapping of mine accidents and socio-economic impact 
took probably no more than ten minutes; this does not leave much time to elaborate on 
reflections of the impact of the landmines. The respondents might respond as a courtesy 
towards the interviewer. After a two- and a half-hour interview, participants in the interview 
want to convey that the visit to the village was welcome and needed. By giving the signal that 
the mines are an important factor in their lives, they convey the message that the interview 
was not in vain, that they do have a problem. They know the destructive effect of the 
landmines, and they are afraid of this. Therefore, to say that they are preoccupied and 
concerned about landmines is not wrong, but it is not the same as to say that the mines have 
an impact. The respondents might adapt their response to the situation. They would be foolish 
not to answer as they do. By giving the answers they think are expected, they increase the 
chances of attracting investment and donor resources to the village. If the village were to 
receive compensation for animals lost due to landmines, the participants would be foolish to 
report only three lost goats.  
In a sense all three of these explanations give some answers as to why the group interview 
provided the responses they did. The obvious question in need of an answer is why the 
 76
participants see it as legitimate to give a modified response. The probable cause should be 
sought within the group dynamics. The rapid assessment approach of the survey may be 
insufficient to build the trust and transfer of power needed to access local realities; instead the 
group adapts responses to fit their perceptions of the survey focus, thereby feeding into the 
self-sustaining myth rather than engaging fully in a community definition of the landmine 
problem.  
5.3 Concluding remarks 
The inability to obtain a representative sample of participants and to create an environment 
suitable for achieving thorough local analysis of landmine impact does pose difficulties for 
the survey, with regard to bringing to the foreground local knowledge and analysis, as held by 
a variety of members of the community. The survey interview takes the form of a rapid 
assessment rather than substantial participatory assessment. The survey does obtain 
information of landmine impact but can hardly capture the complex reality and the diverging 
perceptions present in the community. Specifically, this presentation has assessed whether the 
exclusion of vulnerable groups from the group interview can have the result that important 
impact information is not mapped, and whether the adaptation of the group responses can 
yield answers reflecting the focus of the survey more than the landmine impact in the 
community. This is problematic because the use of participation gives an impression that 
reality is captured, whereas the method used can be insufficient to capture the complexities 
that exist. Although the chapter has pointed to various critical issues in the LIS use of the 
participatory method, the main focus is given to the participatory approach itself. The chapter 
has pointed to dangers both in terms of simplifying local power structures and in terms of 
inability to transfer local knowledge from the community to the outside organisation. Both of 
these issues seem to represent problems connected with the use of the participatory approach, 
but they can be counteracted through the critical awareness of the complexities and the 
diversities of interests present at the local level. 
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Chapter 6  
The Survey Data and Analysis 
This chapter analyses the extent to which local knowledge and analysis is reflected in the 
priorities for mine action. The chapter will present the process of analysis used by the 
Mozambique LIS, discussing the extent to which the analysis is able to integrate local 
knowledge and analysis, enabling local perceptions to form the basis for mine action 
priorities. It will then look at how the impact of landmines on Chifunde was mapped and 
analysed by the Mozambique LIS, in light of the process of analysis described in the first 
section. I conclude with an analytical discussion of how the LIS survey is a part of the shift 
toward participatory approaches, aiming to assess what lessons can be learned from the 
Chifunde case study.  
6.1 The LIS Mozambique analysis of the survey data 
This section will describe the LIS survey’s process of analysis, specifically how the 
information gathered from the survey interviews is entered into the IMSMA landmine 
database to form the basis for impact identification. The impact registration is made on the 
basis of the group interview, using a qualitative mapping of local knowledge and analysis, but 
the information is standardised to fit the indicators set up by the IMSMA database. This 
discussion will use the table presented in Chapter three to look at whether the analysis is 
based on professional objective information of which resources are blocked by the minefield, 
or based on community perceptions of how landmines pose a threat to everyday life. Special 
attention will be given to how the survey is able to combine these two qualities of the data, 
indicating the dangers of combining qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis.  
6.1.1 The Mine Impact Score  
The process of analysis is standardised for all GLS surveys; the recorded information is 
entered into the IMSMA database, giving all the data gathered for the GLS surveys the same 
format. The surveys use a composite indicator called the Mine Impact Score (MIS) to 
designate impact and to set priority for mine action. The MIS is calculated on the basis of 
three types of variables type of contamination, blockage registration, and number of recent 
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victims (Appendix D). Type of contamination refers to whether the community has a problem 
with landmines or UXOs, blockage registration refers to whether resources are blocked by the 
minefield, and number of recent victims refers to whether people have been killed or wounded 
during the two years preceding the survey. The variables concerning type of contamination 
and blockage registration are binary, being recorded either as affected or as not affected; the 
occurrence of recent victims is made cumulative, giving equal importance to each of the 
victims in the past two years. During the survey the group interview discusses the problems 
faced by the community in relation to landmines; the reported problems are later entered into 
the IMSMA database, where the problems reported are assigned to indicators. The MIS score 
assigns a weight to each of the landmine indicators. Each indicator is given a numerical 
weight, assigning a value to the landmine problem; by summarising the different landmine 
problems, it is possible to indicate the impact of the landmines on the community. The 
numerical weight given to the indicators fall within a range, zero indicating that the landmines 
“generally create a very slight impact for the life of the community”, one signifying “a slight 
impact”, two signifying “a serious impact” and three “a very serious impact” (SAC, 2002). 
The numerical importance of contamination type and number of recent victims is fixed by the 
SAC, but the blockage score can be adapted to the country at hand. A blockage of a resource 
considered to be important in one country can be given prominence within the score, while 
the same blockage may be of negligible importance in another country and can be removed 
from the MIS score. Therefore while landmines affect nomadic cultures in Sudan or Yemen, it 
is of no importance in Cambodia; this can be taken into account when weighting the 
importance of each blockage, making the score relevant for each country. The different GLS 
surveys weigh the variables to fit the conditions of the country, assigning a weighting between 
zero and three for each indicator, not exceeding the maximum score of ten for all indicators. 
Through this analysis, the SAC is able to ensure that the results of the individual countries are 
comparable at a global level, while at the same time ensuring that the survey safeguards the 
relevance of the survey to the particular country. 
The MIS weighting is set on the basis of what landmine problems are seen as important for 
each of the countries. “Weights express expert judgement (...) about the importance of a type 
of problem, subjectively averaged over the observed instances in the communities. (...) The 
weight applies to an average impact created by the corresponding kind of blockage.” (SAC, 
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2002:15) At the same time SAC emphasizes the importance of determining the scoring of the 
MIS before the survey is carried out. This is important because adapting the MIS to the 
frequency of the recorded blockages might inflate the number of high-impact communities 
without necessarily reflecting the actual problem faced by the communities. The impact 
should be set to reflect the importance of the blockage. As the score is fixed before the survey 
has started, the “subjective average over observed instances” is limited to the pre-survey pilot 
tests. SAC further encourages the use of the “Nominal Group Technique” within a group of 
national experts with knowledge of the national landmine problem. The expert group ranks 
the indicators individually, and the MIS is set by calculating the mean indicator rank. By 
using this system, the MIS is set primarily according to expert judgement.  
In the case of the Mozambique LIS the MIS was set on the basis of the CIDC’s experience, 
their discussions with knowledgeable persons and a review of relevant literature (CIDC, 
2001:82); none of the national HMA capacities reported that they had taken part in 
determining the impact ranking for the MIS. This indicates that the MIS was set according to 
expert judgement, also in the case of the Mozambique LIS. IND later requested a revision of 
the established MIS because of the large number of communities placed in the low-impact 
category. Their rationale was that for planning purposes it was not useful to have a high 
number of communities in a single category (CIDC, 2001). It is also evident that to apply for 
funding for long-term HMA in Mozambique it can be severely damaging to designate close to 
80% of the landmine contamination to the low-impact category. In conjunction with the 
establishment of different MIS alternatives, the CIDC also established a Normalised 
Composite Index utilising several of the data sources within the IMSMA database, which 
were normally intended for triangulation of information and for quality assurance. The most 
interesting among these controlling variables was the use of the proximity of the affected 
community to the minefield, the size of the population and the perception of increasing or 
decreasing impact over time (CIDC, 2001:87). Weighting indicators after the data collection, 
through the information available in the IMSMA database, can open many possibilities for 
further targeting of HMA. The initial steps taken by the CIDC to analyse data show only some 
of the possibilities that open up through the use of the IMSMA database. The combination of 
MIS and IMSMA can prove a potent tool for ensuring that the HMA can be targeted where it 
can do the most good.  
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The MIS is based on a weak metrics, simply cumulating values given to the various problems 
caused by landmines that are found in each community. The more pervasive the mine 
problem, the higher the landmine impact on the community is said to be. The survey records 
the type of problem caused by landmines in the community but does not measure the 
numerical extent or degree of those problems (Benini, 1999: 6). Therefore having one 
landmine on a field and still being able to cultivate 95% will give the same blockage impact 
as having the whole field blocked, as such the indicators are very dull at the low- and high-
intensity end of the landmine contamination (Benini, 1999:10). If the landmines affect the 
community in a number of areas both in terms of blockage of valuable resources and through 
high accident potential, the score is cumulative for each of the problems the community is 
facing. The MIS score is in this way giving predominance to communities that have a 
pervasive landmine presence, although not based on the amount of the blockage in each case. 
There is also an exception in the GLS surveys for blockages where the community clearly 
expresses that the blockage of a resource has no impact on the community, these blockages 
will not be mapped by the survey.  
The strength of the MIS is that it occupies a middle ground of HMA impact assessment. 
Unlike other existing landmine impact assessments, the LIS does not give predominance to 
particular interest groups. It does not solely assess the economic viability of mine clearance as 
does cost benefit analysis, nor does it only focus on accident prevention. Instead it gives 
priority to those communities that have suffered from landmines by several standards 
including accidents, blockages of economic assets, blockage of basic security, and institutions 
and services. Instead of focusing on any one of these sectors it aims to arouse “human 
compassion” toward communities that experience a complex set of impacts (Benini, 1999:11) 
6.1.2 Composite indicators and the recording of landmine problems 
The first component of the MIS is the indicators mapping the presence of munitions. This 
information is only mapped at the minefield level and returns a simple statement whether 
landmines or unexploded munitions are present or not. The weighting of this indicator is fixed 
within the MIS and cannot be adjusted according to country-specific conditions. A weight of 
serious impact is given for the presence of landmines, and an additional point is given for the 
presence of UXOs raising the indicator value to very serious impact. Designating a score of 
 
very serious impact for the mere presence of landmines and UXOs seems exaggerated both 
compared with the weighting of the other blockages and compared with the recent victims 
score. There is little to indicate that the presence of landmines in itself constitutes any impact 
of social or economic importance. If the landmines do not block any objects or represent any 
insecurity to the community, why should their presence contribute to the community being 
ranked with higher impact? Nor is it credible that the difference in contamination type 
(landmines or UXOs) has different effects on the community impact – that is, different effects 
on how the munitions restrict access to the area. From this presentation it would seem that the 
registration of type of munitions is not linked to perceptions of impact but only looks at the 
objective presence of landmines, and that the information is most useful to the clearance 
operators when deciding on the appropriate clearing techniques. On the contrary, using 
villagers to report the presence of landmines can rarely give an objective identification of a 
minefield. Not all minefields are as well known as the one in Chifunde, where villagers had 
received good knowledge of the positioning of the minefield from the army. In many cases 
the reported minefields will be reports of a perceived threat not of landmine information, 
although this perception will result in the same impact and area restriction as if there had been 
a minefield there. The consequence is that the survey is only able to map suspected mined 
areas, not minefields. Thus the indicator illustrates the conflict between objective information 
and community perceptions found in the survey.  
The second component of the MIS, is the blockage of resources caused by landmines. The 
Mozambique LIS used seven main indicators covering the resources of agricultural land, 
pasture, drinking water, water for other uses, non-agricultural land, housing, roads and other 
infrastructure. These indicators will be examined individually in the following description.  
Blockage of access to agricultural land is the most commonly reported blockage in 
Mozambique. Irrigated and rainfed croplands are recorded as separate blockages in the other 
LIS surveys but were combined in the Mozambique MIS score, mapping all agricultural 
blockages under rainfed land. Irrigated cropland is not widely available in Mozambique, and 
to adapt the score to local conditions, it was removed from the MIS score. The  Mozambique 
LIS designated serious impact to blockage of agriculture, although there was pressure from 
the national co-ordinator for mine action, IND, to raise the weighting of this blockage to very 
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serious impact. It is probably right to give this issue a higher weighting than to other 
blockages because it would focus the score towards local needs and realities, land being the 
single most important factor for food and life security in the rural countryside. On the other 
hand, the issue of land rarely has very high impact on the communities in Mozambique due to 
high land availability; therefore the fact that land has high importance does not mean that the 
blockage of land has high importance. As illustrated by the Chifunde example, the importance 
of agricultural land was due to the context of the community, and the blockage was of 
importance to the community only because there was a population pressure and land 
concentration, with resulting pressure on the agricultural resources. If the pressure on the 
resources is low, the chances are that the utilization of the demined area for agricultural 
purposes would be delayed, and the gain from demining the area will be reduced. The 
IMSMA does map population size and to a certain degree also population pressure. This 
information is not used in the scoring process, but the data can be accessed at a later stage to 
get an indication of the importance of the blockage. But land pressure is also relative to the 
resources available, and this information is not mapped. The IMSMA database can moderate 
the information, but there is a need for more qualitative data to assess the actual impact of the 
blockage. Mapping agricultural land cannot be seen as mapping the blockage of an object. 
The landmines were planted a long time ago; any farms that were blocked by landmines 
would now be overgrown. Therefore mapping agricultural land would either map land usage 
ten years ago or map aspirations to settle into the area now blocked by landmines. But the 
mapping would not map the direct blocking of agricultural land; it would map the presence of 
a levelled piece of land with a potential of being cultivated. Most minefields can be recorded 
as both agricultural areas and pastures, and given that the area has not been used for ten years, 
it would also contain precious wood resources. The blockage of agricultural land is a good 
example of the difficulties connected with mapping object information when the object is not 
visible. The survey is limited to assessing whether a resource is blocked, but it is not able to 
assess whether the resource is perceived to have impact. All issues of agricultural blockage 
are given the same weight within the MIS, thereby removing the potential information on how 
seriously the community is affected by the variable. 
Blockage of access to pasture is considered by the LIS to have serious impact. In the other 
LIS surveys there is a separate indicator for mapping migratory pasture, but this is only used 
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when landmines affect nomadic cultures. This indicator is excluded from the Mozambique 
LIS or mapped as a blockage of fixed pasture where applicable. This indicator holds many of 
the same characteristics as the blockage of agriculture land. The survey is really mapping the 
perceived need for pasture, this aspiration depends on the contextual situation of the 
community and should not be considered a blockage of an object. This indicator is also used if 
there have been any accidents involving animals in the past two years, but there seems to be a 
tendency to over-report the number of livestock involved in accidents, making this indicator a 
weak measure of the impact of the blockage of pastures (personal communication SAC 
January 12th, 2002). This was also seen in the Chifunde interview.  
Blockage of access to drinking water can be a severe problem for the village if there are no 
other water points that cover this need. The Mozambique LIS has designated serious impact to 
this indicator. This indicator has a different form than that seen for farmland and pasture 
indicators, because it is a blockage of a physical object; a water pump can be blocked but 
continues to be a water pump. However, mapping the blockage of a source of drinking water 
does not indicate of the availability of drinking water, as the village might have other points 
of access. Again the blockage of a resource does not necessarily indicate that the blockage has 
any impact on the community, as it would be contextually tied to the availability of drinking 
water in the community. In Chiuti, Millard and Harpviken (2001) found it hard to get 
information on whether there was a blocked water source in the previous minefield, probably 
because people saw it as irrelevant whether there was a water source there as long as it was 
blocked and out of reach. It was not seen having impact on the community. This is a good 
illustration of the difficulty of mapping, objectively, all resources that are blocked by a 
minefield.  
Blockage of access to water for other uses, does pose many of the same problems as seen in 
relation to blockage of drinking water. Since the blocked objects would probably be more 
linked to inhibited access to riverbanks instead of water pumps, therefore the access to other 
water sources does not have the same impact on health-related issues as does drinking water. 
The Mozambique LIS considers this blockage to have only a slight impact on the community; 
IND has pushed for more prominence to this blockage indicator, raising it to a serious impact, 
giving it the same impact as blockage of drinking water.  
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Blockage of access to some non-agricultural land includes nearly all non-agricultural or non-
husbandry-related income sources, ranging from fuel wood to building materials, non-
agricultural food and medical products. The Mozambique LIS has given this a slight impact. 
Case studies reported by the AMAC project show that these items can be of great significance 
to household income and security (Millard and Harpviken, 2001). These resources are 
generally perceived to be important sources of income and are a source of basic security for 
the community; as such they should not be seen as inferior blockage of that of pasture, as is 
the case within this weighting. IND has pushed for increasing the weighting of this blockage 
to a very serious impact. Giving the indicator a prominent position within the score can reflect 
the importance of non-agricultural land within subsistence economies but can also be a result 
of the high frequency of reported blockage, as this would raise the number of high-impact 
communities and increase the funding for mine action in the country. 
Blockage of access to a housing area is given no impact in the scoring for Mozambique LIS. 
This is probably because a housing area would only be triggered by the blockage of 
permanent housing, not semi-permanent housing, which is the main building means in rural 
Mozambique. The blockage of permanent housing would seldom have impact on the local 
population as long as it is not an official facility, and then it would be mapped as other 
infrastructure. Although the indicator is not important for the Mozambique MIS, housing 
would carry the same characteristics as seen for blockage of agriculture, in the sense that 
housing can only be regarded as blockage of an object when the house is standing. As the 
building collapses and is washed away by the rains, the area only carries a potential for 
housing. In the criterion set for the indicator the contextual need for housing is neglected by 
only recording blockage of permanent housing.  
Blockage of one or more roads seems to have consequences similar to those for housing and 
water supply. Roads are permanent objects that easily are given the value of blocked or not 
blocked. The Mozambique LIS has set this blockage as having a slight impact on the 
community. Complicating matters, the SAC protocols states that only village paths and roads 
connecting the village to important facilities and district and province administrations should 
be included in the survey (SAC, 2002). This restricts the cases in which the blockage of roads 
can be used, and it does not necessarily reflect the impact carried by the blockage, although 
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the community might achieve economic gain by clearing roads to access markets and 
government services. Studies of landmine-affected communities find that freedom of 
movement without fear, mobility and independence will in most cases be given higher priority 
than pure economic gains (McGee with Norton, 2000; Millard and Harpviken, 2000).  
Blockage of access to other infrastructure is a category indicating all aspects that have 
economic importance beyond local community interests, such as industry, bridges and dams 
and government services. Mozambique LIS designated a slight impact to these blockages. It 
has been a common problem for the GLS surveys to map these infrastructures systematically, 
as communities do not consider these issues to have impact and therefore do not report them 
as blocked. The blockages of infrastructure mainly have consequences outside the village and 
are therefore not reported as blocked by a subsistence-based village. In Mozambique, as in 
most other conflicts, landmines were used to guard oil pipelines and electricity lines. Clearing 
such infrastructure would be an important task for the Mozambican government in the coming 
years, so that they can be maintained and repaired. Even when mapping infrastructure the 
survey will interview the village closest to the minefield, even though the community may be 
far removed from the minefield and does not suffer any consequences from it. The resulting 
impact description will record the minefield as having no impact on the community and 
therefore will not reflect the actual impact of the minefield. The consequence is that aspects 
that are important for the survey are not recorded. This is clearly the case that best illustrates 
the difference between the objective description of items that are blocked and the resources 
that are reported by the community. The survey was not designed to record all aspects of 
landmines, only to record perceptions of impact as experienced by the local residents. The 
community only gives information on objects that reflect their reality and objects they 
consider to be resources (CIDC, 2001: 50).  
The third component of the MIS is the victim registration. The MIS gives much attention to 
accident occurrences; not only is each incident given a weight of two points, but it is also 
cumulative for each of the recent victims. The inclusion of accidents as a non-economic 
impact factor is interesting and important. The problem is the dominance of the indicator 
within the composite indicator approach. Any community assigned to the high impact 
category is likely to have recent victims. Blockage can seldom give high impact on its own; a 
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community only contaminated by landmines must be affected by at least six of seven of the 
possible blockages, the score hardly gives enough weight to the impacts caused by landmine 
blockages. Ten years have passed since the war in Mozambique, and people are adapting to 
living with the threat and are finding new ways to avoid high-risk activity. The MIS score’s 
dependence on recent accidents must be seen as an important reason that 80% of the 
communities are recorded in the low-impact category. The importance given to the indicator 
is based on the premise that when individuals continue to engage in risk behaviour despite 
knowledge of the risk involved, this indicates that the community is having problems adapting 
to the situation (Benini, 1999). The perseverance of accidents is seen as a good indicator to 
pick up this lack of adaptation. The indicator also counteracts the tendency to only look at the 
economic viability of the mine clearance, as many minefields with a high accident potential 
would not necessarily be cleared. So far, few have tried to integrate the health cost of 
landmines into the equation. Even though mine victims do have significant costs for treatment 
and long-term rehabilitation, these must also be related to the more general health situation in 
the country (Taksdal, 2001). The inclusion of the number of victims is, as such, an important 
and a good innovation in the development of indicators, because it is able to pick up accidents 
and health risks without making them a question of the cost and economic viability of the 
demining. The discussion is an important one, but there are not enough data on the issue to 
give a decisive answer as to whether accidents are a good indicator for landmine impact. 
Millard and Harpviken (2000; 2001) have in their case studies in Mozambique questioned the 
assumption that the occurrence of accidents is a good indicator of high landmine impact. They 
point out that in many cases accidents caused by landmines were just that: accidents. 
Accidents are often the result of carelessness, foolishness or ignorance. Therefore a strong 
focus on accident reduction would not necessarily target high-impact communities. This 
engagement in risk activity is also related to the degree of adaptation and normalisation of the 
post-conflict situation. In isolated cases this normalisation of risk can lead to risk activity 
being carried out in lack of respect for the danger and out of convenience (Millard and 
Harpviken, 2000). Nor is the occurrence of past accidents a good indicator of future accidents. 
The indicator is not able to take into consideration that societies learn and therefore assumes 
that the community will have a steady number of victims. The indicator does not take into 
account the context of the accident, and whether the community does experience a continued 
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accident potential. Again we arrive at the conclusion that it is not the occurrence of accidents 
that carries impact; the impact is entrenched in how the community is able to deal with the 
landmine presence, since such accidents are but a symptom of the problem, not the impact. 
How individuals act in response to the landmines will change over time and be connected to 
changes in the capabilities and vulnerabilities experienced by the individual. 
6.1.3 The analytical process 
The above presentation of the LIS process of analysis illustrates two difficulties: first, the 
survey does not map the conditionality of the impact but instead records all problems of the 
same type as indicating the same impact. Secondly, the survey does not separate sufficiently 
between the object information and perceptions; therefore the survey is not able to record all 
resources blocked by the minefield. 
The MIS is based on a calculation that assigns the same weight to all landmine problems of 
the same type. In this sense, the survey looks only at the blockage of a resource and not at the 
extent to which the community has access to the resource or to alternative resources. The 
survey does not distinguish between communities where the blocked resources have an 
impact on daily life and those where the object blocked is of no central importance. The 
example of a blocked water pump was used to illustrate that the blockage of one water pump 
is not significant to the community if there is access to other water pumps that are working. 
Steps could be taken to modify the impact; by weighting the indicator according to how much 
of the resource was blocked, parallel sources of the resource, population pressure and pressure 
on the resource it is possible to avoid giving excess impact to an indicator. By weighting the 
indicators within the individual blockage, it would be possible to reduce the importance of 
physical blockages that do not carry impact. However, the analysis of the extent of the impact 
of a particular landmine problem can only partially be produced by the use of the IMSMA 
database. This presentation has illustrated that the group interview did provide information on 
the extent to which the community was affected by the various landmine problems. Yet this 
information was not entered into IMSMA but was replaced by standardised weighting of the 
impact, set by the MIS. 
Furthermore, the survey displays a difficulty in separating information concerning those 
objects blocked by the minefield from the perceptions of what objects hold impact for the 
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community. The survey poses the question of how the landmines affect the community but 
records information on what objects that are blocked in the minefield. As a result, the survey 
displays problems of recording all of the aspects of interest for the survey – most importantly, 
aspects of interests that are blocked by the minefield but of no concern to the village. The 
inability to establish the relative importance of the landmine problem of a community makes 
it difficult to conduct statistical analysis of how many communities experience a particular 
problem.  
6.2 The findings of impact in Chifunde and the resulting data 
This section studies how the local knowledge and analysis was recorded by the LIS interview 
in Chifunde; how the recorded information was reflected in the mine action priority assigned 
to the community; and how the impact found during the LIS survey interview compares with 
the information of landmine problems that were brought up in my community study.  
6.2.1 Description of the minefields in Chifunde 
Three minefields were identified in the Chifunde interview27. The first one was registered a 
one-hour walk from Chifunde village, close to a village called Catawa. This was a single 
landmine situated on a footpath; as a response the path was diverted around the mine. The 
landmine was reported to have been placed in 1969 and was not marked. The second 
minefield was close to the village of Catete, reported to be seven kilometres from Chifunde; 
later I found it to be as far as fifteen kilometres away. The minefield was contaminated with 
landmines and unexploded ordnances and was reported to be one square kilometre in size. 
The landmines were laid in 1977 to protect an old military installation. The site is now 
marked with official signs by the NPA. The last minefield was along one side of Chifunde. It 
is also quite large, 1.2 kilometres by 200 metres (240 hectares), and it was only contaminated 
with landmines. The landmines were planted in 1992, the same year the peace accord was 
signed in Rome. The area is now marked with official signs put up prior to the demining 
operation. 
                                                 
27 The two minefields in Catawa and Catete were not known to the LIS survey team prior to the survey. If the 
survey team had known, the minefields would have been mapped in separate interviews, but as they were 
brought up during the interview, the survey team conducted a single mapping for all minefields.  
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There were no human casualties in any of the three minefields in the Chifunde area. Therefore 
the extended victim registration section was not used. There are three questions in the 
questionnaire that map blockage caused by the presence of landmines and the socio-economic 
impact of the minefields. The first identifies and maps the major problems caused by 
landmines (G23), and the other two assess the extent of this impact (G24 and 25). The G23 
question asks how the landmines affect the village. Most of the survey is dependent on this 
single question to access information on the landmine impact. The group interview in 
Chifunde identified three issues of importance to the impact of landmines on the community. 
First, locals could not get access to the farmland. Secondly, they could not get access to fuel 
wood and material for housing construction. Thirdly, the minefield was impeding village 
expansion, resulting in higher density of the village housing.  
When asked whether this situation was worse or better now than before (question G24), they 
responded that the situation had deteriorated after 1994, largely as an effect of the refugees 
returning after the war, which led to an increase in population. Furthermore, they reported that 
the fear varied throughout the year. They were more afraid during the rain season, because 
they were worried that the mines could shift into new areas previously unaffected by 
landmines (question G25). This contrasted to some extent with the responses I received 
during the follow-up study, in which the situation was described to be less severe after the 
refugees started returning to their place of origin and also after the area was officially marked 
by the demining agency (Interview, Ziambene). This could indicate that the LIS group 
interview overstated the impact in comparison with that described in the follow-up interviews. 
It is important to emphasise here that I do not wish to undermine the perceptions stated in the 
group interview, but the answers recorded during the interview do not seem to reflect general 
opinions throughout the village, which were more pronounced in the group interview than in 
the follow-up individual interviews. It is, however, important that LIS enable the community 
to analyse trends and changes in the landmine situation, giving a dynamic understanding of 
the landmine impact and how it affects the village. It is an aspect that had not been possible 
through the static problem identification used previously. 
The three topics that were brought up in the group interview were blocked access to cropland, 
to firewood and to building materials and lack of space for village expansion. When these 
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data came to the analytical office in Maputo to be entered into the IMSMA database, they 
were first reduced to three key words that were entered into the database. On the basis of 
these three words, the blockages were established and the MIS calculated. I have not had 
access to the final data or the IMSMA database, but by using the IMSMA database indicators 
and the MIS score used for the Mozambique LIS, it is possible to assume what impact would 
be assigned to Chifunde.  
The minefield would be recorded to block access to agricultural land. Although this is mapped 
under one indicator, the IMSMA database further divides this blockage into irrigated or 
rainfed land, which are again subdivided to type of crop cultivated: grain, fruit or vegetables. 
The Chifunde interview does not give any descriptions of the type of cropland blocked, but in 
the case of Chifunde, the blockage should have been recorded as rain-fed and grain. Further, 
the blockage of wood resources would be recorded as blockage of non-agricultural land, the 
subdivision within the IMSMA database would further record Chifunde to have blocked 
access to building materials and to fuel wood. The report of lack of possibility for expanding 
the housing area is not a blockage and would not be recorded. The information would not be 
mapped, first because the Mozambique LIS does not use this indicator within the MIS score 
as they do not consider it as important for the landmine situation of the country, and secondly 
because the housing indicator is designed to map blocked objects and not the aspirations or 
the needs of the community connected to housing areas. The issue of the 55 dead goats was 
not mentioned as an impact in the group interview (discussion under G23) but was reported 
during the mapping of recent accidents involving livestock. The occurrence of animals killed 
or wounded was mapped as a blockage of pasture within the survey and the IMSMA database. 
When the resulting mine impact score for Chifunde was calculated, the village would be 
assigned a score of two for the presence of landmines, two for the blockage of agriculture, 
two for the blockage of pasture and one for the blockage of non-agricultural land. This would 
total a MIS score of seven and place Chifunde within the medium-impact category (Appendix 
D). But if the score of two, from the false report of accidents involving animals, was removed 
from the score, this would have placed the village in the low-impact category.  
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6.2.2 Mapping impact for several minefields 
Despite the mapping of three minefields during the LIS survey in Chifunde, the description of 
impact given by the group interview only seems to describe one of the minefields, 
simultaneously only one of the minefields affected the village of Chifunde directly. The G23 
question explicitly asks for problems caused by landmines in “this” village. It is clear that the 
response given by the group interview is contextually connected to the situation of the village 
of Chifunde. The villagers of Chifunde naturally have good knowledge of the surrounding 
area and the neighbouring villages and were therefore able to give accurate details of three 
minefields around the village. But they would not have accurate knowledge about how the 
minefields affect the population living close to them. Even though the impact was recorded 
for only one of the minefields, the impact recorded in the interview is assigned to all of the 
minefields, as there was only one impact assessment, thereby denying the other villages the 
opportunity to voice their perception of the impact of the minefield proximate to their village.  
I have not visited the other villages affected by landmines around Chifunde, partly for security 
reasons and partly because the object of my study was the village of Chifunde. But from the 
maps drawn by the LIS survey and the description given by the group interview for drawing 
the maps, it is possible to predict some issues of impact that might be caused by the presence 
of landmines. The first minefield was a single landmine located on a footpath; this path was 
diverted around the landmine and is therefore not likely to pose restrictions on movement. 
Nor is this impact mentioned in the Chifunde interview. The blockage of the footpath would 
in any case fall outside the criterion needed to be mapped as a blockage of roads, as it was 
only a footpath and did not block the only access to the administrative centre. The second 
minefield, in Catete, is larger and probably fits better with the impact mapped in Chifunde. 
The village of Catete was reported to be in the centre of a 2000-metre by 500 metre minefield.  
The mined area was reported to be wooded and levelled and could therefore be mapped as 
blocking both resources of farmland and of wood and building materials. But Catete was 
never a refugee camp and did not host the repatriation of returnees the way Chifunde did, 
therefore limiting the conflicts caused by a large population expansion. Moreover, the 
enclosure of Chifunde is quite different from the one in Catete. Catete, reportedly being 
situated in the middle of a minefield, could be subject to more substantial blockage of safe 
movement. It is difficult to say whether the two villages experience a similar impasse to 
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village expansion. The minefield in Catete is probably blocking access to the river and 
perhaps to some degree also the road, but this was not mapped in the Chifunde interview. All 
in all it is difficult to assume what physical blockage and community impacts are experienced 
by Catete on the basis of the information given in the LIS survey. It is evident, however, that 
the impact in Chifunde interview does not reflect the problems experienced by the village of 
Catete. 
I witnessed a parallel to this situation during quality assurance of data in the LIS analytical 
office in Maputo. One of the data entries into the IMSMA database concerned a minefield 
mapped a long distance form the site of the group interview. The LIS employee commented 
that it was not unusual for villagers to move great distances by foot and that one can expect 
survey informants to have good knowledge of an extensive area surrounding the location of 
the interview. This is true, and even more so because of the population mobility experienced 
during and after the conflict due to the large number of IDPs. But knowledge of the 
whereabouts of a minefield and the blockages connected to it does not imply that the 
informants have good information on the impact of that minefield, which can rarely be 
experienced by people not living in proximity to the minefield. This can have quite far-
reaching implications as to what the data can be used for. The information mapped is limited 
because of its local embeddedness. To assume a diffusion of the impact beyond the site of the 
mapping, generalising the impact to the surrounding area, clearly weakens the relevance of 
the data. In Chifunde this was done when the village was used as a site for the group 
interview, whereas the minefields addressed did not necessarily have an impact on the 
Chifunde community. In this sense the impact recorded in Chifunde is assumed to radiate out 
from Chifunde and have the same impact on the communities of Catete and Catawa as the 
landmines have within Chifunde. Ultimately, the LIS survey was only able to record the 
impact experienced by people living in Chifunde. 
6.2.3 How is the Chifunde landmine impact reflected in the analysis? 
The interview took two and a half hours, including the mapping of the three minefields and 
the socio-economic impact on the village of Chifunde. Only 15 minutes of this time was used 
for mapping the information that forms the basis for calculating the MIS score for the 
community. The most time-consuming activity was the drawing of maps of the mine-affected 
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areas28. The survey team recorded the discussion of the group interview; however, the survey 
team did not record the whole discussion but reduced the data information so that they were 
left with the topics that were discussed. In the case of Chifunde this reduced the data recorded 
to three topics.  
In mapping in Chifunde, the mapping of blockage of pasture was the decisive indicator, 
elevating the village from the low-impact to the medium-impact category. The reporting of 
this blockage was a result of the internal group dynamics rather than actual impact, and the 
indicator should not have been used in the case of Chifunde because there were no recent 
accidents involving livestock. The area cleared could very well be used for pasture, but the 
group interview did not emphasise the importance of this use during the group discussion of 
impact, nor was it mentioned in any of the interviews during my community study. The case 
of Chifunde was a good example of the importance of a thorough discussion of how the 
community is affected by landmines, as the limited discussion in the Chifunde case failed to 
bring up all the issues concerning how landmines affect the village. A rudimentary discussion 
compared to an in-depth and thorough discussion can make the difference in whether multiple 
impacts versus a single impact is recorded. This could amount to the difference between low 
and medium or medium and high impact designated to the community, thereby reducing or 
increasing the likelihood of the village being given priority for demining.  
The two remaining blockages recorded by the survey, wood resources and arable land, were 
important to Chifunde. This should not be downplayed, since mapping key resources is 
undoubtedly the main aim of the survey. The fieldwork interviews reported that wood 
resources were of importance to the community, but it probably did not have a big impact, 
mainly because there seemed to be other ways to access this resource. But as the MIS score 
gives equal importance to all reports of the same problem, it is not possible to adapt the 
importance of the indicator within the MIS score to fit the importance of the blockage in 
Chifunde. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the two blockages of wood and 
                                                 
28 Map drawing was very time-consuming, as all communication had to go through an interpreter. The detailed 
descriptions and the need for accuracy took up most of the time during the interview. The discussion also tended 
to switch to Portuguese for ease of communication, excluding most of the participants form taking part. This was 
clearly the time when most participants left. 
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agriculture. Even though they are given different weights in the MIS score, this does not 
reflect the differences in levels of conflicts connected to the two resources. The blockage of 
wood resources, in the case of Chifunde, can be compared with similar blockages elsewhere, 
because the wood resource is non-contextual and only represents the resource of wood. 
However, agriculture has an impact on the community not only connected to the blockage of 
farmland itself but also due to polarisation of land ownership, giving arable land a higher 
impact to the community than the resource alone. A different community with contextual 
vulnerabilities connected to wood resources would not compare with the impact found in 
Chifunde. Simply comparing the blockages does not necessarily reflect the importance of the 
blockage. 
None of the aspects connected to the enclosure experienced by Chifunde were mapped by the 
survey. These aspects were connected to the landmine situation in terms of both basic security 
and economic development (Interview, Lissene). For the community the village enclosure was 
seen to be an important impact, blocking access to much-needed housing areas. It was also the 
cause of insecurity for those living close to the land subsidence (Interview, Luis). Moreover, 
the claustrophobic enclosure could lead to a sense of powerlessness, as the village sees itself 
as restricted, not being able to develop and expand. This last issue was clearly important for 
the District Administration when deciding to apply for demining of the village. By removing 
the confinement of the village, the Administration would seek to expand the district capital 
with the purpose of gaining economic development. AMAC case studies (Millard and 
Harpviken, 2000; 2001) frequently point to issues of freedom of movement as one of the 
resources most highly valued by landmine-affected communities. But the survey is not able to 
map this impact because it is not associated with a blockage. 
When all issues of impact for Chifunde are recorded, they are calculated through the MIS 
score. In the Chifunde case two indicators were defined by the MIS having serious impact 
(landmines, agricultural land) and one as having slight impact (non-agricultural land). All the 
same, the MIS score classified the community as low impact (blockage of pasture is 
excluded). As such, a low-impact community can be composed of solely high-importance 
blockages. The individual importance of the indicators is lost in the calculation of the score. 
This means that there are actually two standardisations: first, the composite statement 
 96
reflecting the situation in each community, and secondly the impact score reflecting the 
composite statement. Looking back on how Chifunde’s landmine impact was reflected in the 
analysis, there is not much indication to suggest why the community was classified as it was. 
The local analysis of impact recorded through the group interview was replaced by a standard 
non-contextual impact. As the case of Chifunde illustrates, the importance of agricultural land 
was contextually tied to the land concentration. The real impact of the blockage would 
therefore be through the mapping of perceptions of how the blockage affects the community. 
In Chifunde this was mapped, but standardisation classifies all aspects of blocked agriculture 
as the same.  
During the community study in Chifunde, agricultural land was reported to have impact for 
the community and was recorded as such by the LIS. Wood resources were identified as 
blocked even though they were not of great importance; the blockage was standardised by the 
survey and mapped as blockage of non-agricultural land. Access to pastures was not blocked 
by the minefield, but the blockage was recorded by the survey. The land subsidence issue was 
reported to have impact but was not recorded by the LIS. Finally, there are two mined areas 
that were recorded as mined, but the impact of these minefields was not recorded at all. The 
LIS survey in Chifunde only reports the blockages found within village perimeters and is 
unable to reflect the impact of landmines in the surrounding minefields. The use of a 
participatory approach to map community impact indicates the ability to bring to the 
foreground local perceptions of impact.  But the analysis of the Chifunde data illustrate that 
there were several impacts, some of which were recorded and others neglected, some which 
gained emphasis and others which lost emphasis through the process of analysis. 
6.3 Can local knowledge form HMA policy and practice? 
The survey had clear intentions of mapping and analysing both blockages and socio-economic 
indicators, as well as people’s perceptions of the landmine situation. This discussion has 
suggested that there is a tension between the method used for mapping impact and the method 
used for analysing the data. Starting out with the aim of getting the best of two worlds, the 
resulting data and analysis prove unable to respond to the needs of either world.  
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6.3.1 The shift revisited 
The second research question examines the extent to which the impact assessment is able to 
draw on local knowledge and analysis to form priorities for mine action. The definitions given 
for the LIS surveys in Chapter 3 outline two parallel needs for the survey. On the one hand, 
the SAC definition of the survey states that rough calculations are to be made to give relative 
socio-economic importance of the landmine presence, indicating that the data analysis is 
meant to make the data comparable. On the other hand, the Mozambique LIS specifies that 
the survey should provide an overview of the social and economic impact as perceived by the 
residents of landmine-affected communities, indicating that the relative importance of the 
landmine situation should be based on the community analysis of the situation. The discussion 
above has assessed the extent to which the survey is able to achieve the best of both worlds, 
using local knowledge to assess relative socio-economic impact on the community. The 
discussion should also serve as a foundation for assessing to what extent the shift has moved 
priority setting within HMA from professional impact identification to community impact 
identification.  
The description of the composite indicators given above illustrates that the survey does carry 
the potential to pick up both subjective and objective information through the interviews. On 
the one hand, the blockage indicators give a passive description of land use; on the other 
hand, they will ultimately carry information of a subjective nature like hopes and aspirations 
for the future of the village. The balance between subjective and objective aspects varies from 
indicator to indicator, but all the composite indicators carry elements of both. The case study 
indicates that the survey has not successfully mapped all objects that are blocked. At the same 
time the survey does not fit into the community focus because the analysis is not able to 
valorise the local opinions, but removes information of degree of impact and replaces it with a 
standardized impact weighting. The description of the process of analysis shows that the 
survey is not able to record either of these aspects or has problems doing so. This leads us to 
position the LIS survey as a middle ground where local opinions are judged through the 
priorities of the expert professional.  
The following table indicates the need for a new analytical category to describe the position of 
the LIS within the shift. The survey does have elements of traditional expert analysis, in 
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which the premises for analysis is set by expert opinion, with the aim of assessing objectively 
which resources are blocked by landmines, but the survey also has elements of participation in 
which the community is enabled to analyse the landmine situation and give details of hopes 
and aspirations. There is a need to expand the previous table and add a new column with an 
intermediate position, in which local experts identify resources within an analytical 
framework set up by outside experts.  
 
 Degree of participation / position within the shift  
 Professional Intermediate position Community 
Power Expert  Local expert  Participation  
Knowledge Objective information Expert-defined community-identified  Perceptions 
 Table 2: Composite indicators as inhabiting the middle ground within the shift.  
6.3.2 The relation between data and analysis 
The strength of the data analysis lies in its treatment of resource information. Resources are 
given a numerical value, and the importance of the resource is directly reflected in the 
importance given to the community. At the same time the survey methodology are incapable 
of recording the presence of all objects blocked by the minefield. The analysis is strongest 
where the method is weakest. The description of Chifunde and the composite indicators 
illustrates a difficulty in arriving at an objective description of the blockages caused by the 
minefield, first because not all of the indicators refer directly to objects (for example, 
agricultural land, pasture and non-agricultural areas), and secondly because the interview 
focuses on how landmines affect the community. This means that issues of interest for the 
survey may be overlooked, since they are not perceived as significant by the community. This 
is primarily in relation to infrastructure and industries that have an impact beyond the 
community and does not relate to the subsistence economy of the community. 
[The Mozambique LIS] was designed primarily to gather information on the perceptions of the 
residents of the landmine-affected communities of the current impacts of [Suspected Mined Areas] on 
themselves and their communities. There are, therefore, aspects of the landmine situation in 
Mozambique on which the LIS cannot be expected to cast light, including: the location of mined areas 
that do not impact communities; the impacts of mined areas near communities but that do not affect 
them, such as blocked access to electrical transmissions or water pipelines that do not service the 
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adjacent communities; and victims of landmines (...) who are not affiliated with or known to any 
community. (CIDC, 2001:50) 
In some ways this is in accordance with the aim of the survey, as it opens for the opportunity 
to exclude objects that are reported not to have any impact at all, only mapping objects that 
are of importance to the village. The survey method aims to map perceptions, this does have 
implications for the aim of mapping the relative importance of the suspected mined area. If 
not all aspects of landmines are mapped systematically, two communities affected the same 
way might be mapped differently, and the survey cannot reflect the relative importance of the 
community. If the survey aims to give equal impact to all objects of the same kind, it would 
be better for all resources to be mapped objectively. The objects recorded by the survey are 
contextually tied to the communities’ perception of the impact. Contextual data do not 
represent the best starting point for statistical analysis. 
Conversely, the strength of the methodology lies in the ability to map perceptions of how 
landmines affect the community. The survey team facilitates the group to display local 
knowledge as well as to analyse how the situation affects and inhibits community activities. 
At the same time, the data analysis is not ideal for maintaining this knowledge, either to 
assign priority to the community or to inform long-term planning and policy. The 
methodology are strongest where the analysis is weakest. The findings from Chifunde and the 
discussions of the indicators illustrate that the survey did map local landmine analysis but that 
this information was lost in the standardisation process of the LIS survey. The issue of 
aspirations for future land use was probably one of the most intricate in the survey analysis 
process, since it was included as information in the mapping of some indicators but was 
excluded in others. The mapping of Chifunde gave details of community aspirations and 
perceptions of how landmines affected the community. But for the LIS survey to be able to 
record these aspirations, they had to be designated objects that were blocked. In Chifunde 
agriculture was mapped while housing was both excluded from the mapping and from the 
scoring analysis. Both problem areas must be seen as potential uses of the area and as 
reflecting aspirations for future use; both reported blockages were perceived by the 
community to have an impact. The Chifunde case study described the enclosure of the 
community and the blockage of aspirations for further development of the community as a 
landmine impact but this does not refer to a checkbox in the survey and cannot be recorded. 
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Furthermore, the most important blockage created by landmines is the blockage of freedom: 
freedom of movement, independence and self-respect; freedom to walk without fear. The 
survey does not have the ability to map aspects of landmines that do not have a physical 
manifestation.  
6.3.3 Whose standardisation  
There will always be loss of information when data are put through a standardisation process. 
Standardisation of information is a necessary process for the interview data to fit into a 
national survey. Ideally, the standardisation process simply groups information into bulks, all 
information within a category reflecting the same problem. Through standardisation it is 
possible to assess how many communities experience a given problem. For all objects to 
reflect the same category the data must be non-contextual. The impact I found for Chifunde 
was connected to objects (for example, agriculture and housing), but the impact of these 
objects was tied to the context of the community. Agriculture was considered a scarce 
resource because of the high degree of land concentration; housing was of importance because 
of the vulnerability of land subsidence and the enclosure experienced by the community. It is 
important to understand that impact cannot be objectified in a way such that the object would 
still refer back to the impact. The data that were standardised were to a greater or lesser extent 
contextual; the case of Chifunde clearly shows that impact was connected to the context of the 
community. If the vulnerabilities were resolved, the impact of the landmines would not be 
equally severe; therefore the de-contextualised, standardised information did not reflect the 
landmine severity. If impact results from a social process and lack of adaptation to a problem, 
assigning it a physical phenomenon would reduce it to object information. The danger of 
standardisation is therefore to assume that the standardised data reflect back to the original 
impact, or that objects that are standardised necessarily are carriers of impact. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, this means that attention is still given to the physical presence of the 
landmines, not to the social context in which they occur. The analysis is based on the 
blockage of objects, whereas little attention is given to the social dynamics that results from 
the blockage.  
It would be easy to ascribe the loss of impact information to the process of standardisation. 
But the above description points to a deeper problem when standardising the survey data. The 
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loss of information is a matter of who defines the categories and the language for the analysis. 
Although information is gathered from the local community, the community’s analysis of the 
situation is not recorded or entered into the survey format. The information is judged and 
scrutinised to fit into pre-defined categories that do not necessarily reflect the need of the 
community, and the analysis assigns a weighting to the priorities set up by the community. In 
one sense this constitutes a moral problem, as the impact initially set by the community is 
ignored and instead given a standardised impact designated by a planner or a policy maker. 
By pre-defining the variables used to identify impact, the analysis uses the vocabulary of 
policy makers to identify local perceptions. The danger is that the vocabulary does not reflect 
local problems. The process of participation becomes an arena where outside values are 
entrenched on local realities, not the other way around (Kothari, 2001). The above discussion 
has pointed to some issues where the survey indicators do not necessarily reflect local needs, 
the most notable example being freedom of movement, but the discussion has also criticised 
some of the criteria for the use of indicators, such as housing and road blockage. The use of a 
standardised language makes it difficult to adapt the impact analysis to the context of the 
country at hand. The analysis enables national authorities to generate context-specific 
indicators to fit to the special conditions of each country and also to adapt the weighting of the 
MIS score. This analytical adaptation is still expert-defined and is not necessarily based on 
local analysis for confirmation or adaptation. For the data analysis to reflect the shift taking 
place within development and reconstruction theory, it would have to find a different way of 
opening up for a community definition of impact. The LIS survey should engage the 
participants of the pilot interviews (carried out prior to the survey) in a discussion of what 
indicators should be included in the survey. More importantly, the weighting of the indicators 
should be sensitive to the community analysis concerning the degree of the landmine 
problem, and be able to map contextual variations of the landmine impacts. Although this 
would hardly resolve all the problems associated with the process of standardisation, it would 
bring the analytical process closer to an integration of a community definition of landmine 
problems. 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated the duality of the survey indicators as they carry both contextual 
and non-contextual information. Furthermore, the chapter has indicated that the analysis of 
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the survey data distorts the division between local and expert knowledge by analysing local 
knowledge and analysis according to expert-defined criteria. These two discussions have 
illustrated the difficulty of answering the second research question. The survey does not 
choose between different strategies to map impact but tries to combine them to achieve the 
best of two worlds. The survey does record the data through community analysis but does not 
analyse the data by the same standard. The LIS analysis applies local information but is not 
necessarily based on local knowledge and analysis. Standardisation will always remove data 
diversity but will give information on new areas of analysis. Being able to conduct statistical 
analysis with local knowledge would have yielded the best of two worlds, because it would 
allow policy and planning to target the needs of the main stakeholders of HMA, namely the 
community. I would argue that the concept of impact refers to how communities are affected 
by landmines; reducing information to blockage of resources does not necessarily reflect the 
impact the landmines have on the community, as the resource might or might not have impact 
on the community. I would therefore argue that if standardisation of data should reflect the 
priorities of the communities, the community analysis regarding the degree of the landmine 
problem should be integrated into the survey analysis. The analysis must be based upon the 
weighting of impact as experienced by the community.  
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to study the changes taking place within HMA in the light of 
the general shift toward participatory approaches in the theory of development and post-war 
reconstruction. The shift is founded on the notion that development policies and practices that 
are based on research with intended beneficiaries are more likely to be relevant for the 
primary stake holders, and therefore more likely to be sustainable (Kothari, 2001). With this 
point of departure the thesis set out to investigate to what extent the participatory method 
adopted by the LIS survey succeeded in bringing to the foreground local knowledge and 
analysis as held by a variety of members of the affected local communities, and to what extent 
the local knowledge and analysis were reflected in the priorities for mine action. 
In conclusion, the thesis has described a substantial shift within theory of development and 
post-war reconstruction; most importantly, the shift can be seen in how success is measured. 
Success is measured by the extent to which mine action is able to alleviate human suffering 
and generate sustainable community development. The shift has redefined who are the 
primary stakeholders and what issues are most legitimately targeted. The shift has changed 
the definition of success in HMA; external experts can no longer set criteria for success 
according to macro economic or infrastructural measures but define it a at a micro level 
referring to communities and their suffering under the threat of landmines. This thesis has 
analysed the ability of participatory approaches to achieve the understanding needed to target 
local needs, finding that, although success is defined through the alleviation of local 
problems, the ability to understand these problems is not yet optimal. 
Several factors have been identified that inhibit the ability of the participatory approach, as 
applied within the Mozambican LIS, to pick up information on how landmines affect a variety 
of members within the local community. Ultimately, the thesis has challenged the 
participatory approach’s simplistic notion of local power structures; despite aims to the 
contrary, the approach preserves power constellations both within the community and 
between the community and the outside organisation. This simplistic understanding of local 
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power structures has led to the inability to gain access to the perceptions held by vulnerable 
groups in Chifunde and resulted in the loss of valuable information about the complexities of 
how the landmines affect the community. Furthermore, the inability to transfer power 
between the survey team and the community, in the context of the group interview, had the 
consequence that the group interview adapted some of its responses to the theme in focus for 
the survey. These issues illustrate the difficulties the survey has in bringing to the foreground 
local knowledge and analysis as held by a variety of members of the local communities. The 
participatory approaches are often thought to yield more relevant information, better suited to 
describe local realities, but the simplistic understanding of both power and knowledge 
described in relation to the participatory approach inhibits access to local knowledge and 
analysis. 
The thesis has also examined several obstacles that inhibit the transfer of local knowledge and 
analysis to form priorities for mine action. The use of participation within the survey has clear 
implications both for the type of data generated and for the data analysis. The survey aimed at 
reflecting local perceptions of landmine impact but at the same time yielding comparable 
situation descriptions by applying standardised indicators. The thesis argues that the 
predefined process of analysis does not necessarily reflect the local knowledge and analysis, 
most importantly because the standardisation of the survey information does not allow the 
community to analyse the severity of a reported landmine problem but assumes that all 
problems of a certain type have the same impact on the community. This standardisation is 
necessary to compare the importance of the landmine problem across several communities. In 
response, the thesis argues that the use of community analysis of landmine situation inhibits 
the ability to compare landmine impact between villages, as the community does not describe 
the accurate socio-economic blockages caused by the minefield but describes the social and 
economic implications of the landmines for the community, thereby neglecting information 
that would have made the community impact comparable with other affected communities.  
The Chifunde community study illustrates that perceptions of impact vary with the capacities 
and vulnerabilities vested in the individual. The fieldwork was able to identify several 
different perspectives of how landmines affect the community, and the priorities and impact 
weighting set down by the LIS survey must be seen as one of these views. This diversity of 
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how landmines can be seen to affect a community is important because a landmine survey can 
in principle choose to target any one of these realities. Although the author of this thesis has 
advocated the importance of adapting HMA to fit the needs of the main stakeholders, it is 
equally true that the survey could have been conducted without the use of participation, based 
only on expert observation and expert defined criterion. Such a survey would be able to 
compare the communities using a uniform understanding of social and economic 
considerations of landmine importance and enable the survey to designate an impact ranking 
reflecting the relative importance of the community. The LIS survey did not distinguish 
adequately between the different perceptions of landmine problems and therefore tried to 
integrate several logics within their survey. The thesis argues that the survey becomes unable 
to fully reflect the realities and the analysis presented by the individual communities, nor is 
the survey able to achieve their own aim of comparable impact identification.  By combining 
its two primary aims, the survey loses much information both of qualitative but also 
quantitative information. The thesis has therefore found that the survey holds an intermediate 
position within the shift toward the use of participatory approaches. 
Despite shortcomings, the shift visible in general development and post-conflict theory and 
policy is clearly also present in HMA. There is a clear movement toward assessing how 
landmines affect local communities and also a fundamental rethinking of the concept of 
impact. Mine action is still a young discipline, and the integration of socio-economic 
indicators within national landmine surveys is in itself a great shift and has illustrated that the 
sector is still evolving and adapting to the new measures of success. This thesis has aimed to 
highlight some of the challenges that follow the aim of understanding local realities and calls 
for a further critical awareness of local complexities.  
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Appendix A: Plan of Inquiry 
AMAC Community Study Approach; Plan of Inquiry 
 
 
Methodology (see chapter appendices) 
Field visit period 
 Case selection 
 Access/Dooropener  
 Staff (surveyors/translator) 
 Constraints/practical difficulties 
 Data 
 No. of survey respondents  
 No. of primary respondents  
 Documents 
  
 
Community background 
Village geographical composition (with maps) 
Population 
Population density 
War history  
Mine problem history 
Minefield - size and location  
 
 
Economic field  
Agriculture 
Land (per household)  
Land rights/ownership 
Land tenure system 
Type of crops grown 
Fruit trees 
Irrigation/access to water 
Fishing 
Hunting 
Wood resources 
Animals 
Household water 
Diet 
Markets 
Transport (within/outside) 
Employment  
Income 
Use of cash 
Economic implications of landmines 
 
 
Human field 
  Perceptions of security  
Injuries directly caused by mines  
 Victim profiles 
 Evacuation facilities 
           Surgical facilities 
Health 
           Access to medical proffesionals 
 Access to health education 
 Most common diseases 
 Access to clean drinking water 
 Sanitation 
Education 
 Educational infrastructure and materials 
 Teachers  
 Access to school during war 
 Access to higher education 
 Mine awareness in education 
 Attitudes to education 
 Literacy rates 
 
Social field 
Local institutions  
Local leadership 
 Conflict resolution mechanisms  
Religion 
Tradition of collective mobilization 
 Common resources 
 For private benefit  
           Recreational mobilization 
Local solidarity 
 Social support 
 Economic support 
   Shift in community composition  
Family composition 
 
The HMA operation 
Knowledge about operation 
Confidence in operation 
Economic importance 
Mine awareness 
Potential use of land 
Other humanitarian need of the community 
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Appendix B: Interview Register 
Chifunde community study interviews 
Name of Informant Special Remarks Date of Interview 
Bernardo Simione District administration November 7th 
Aleria Roniano Central Landowner  November 8th 
Augusto Romao President November 8th and 20th 
Elisa Cinco Central Landowner November 9th 
Maria Janeiro FRELIMO party member November 9th 
Joaqui Bulako Chafuzika Nephew of Previous Mfumo November 9th 
Siria Ganizane Works at Maize Mill November 9th 
José Ziambene Secretary of the Bairro November 10th and 15th 
Manhanhi Geguessene Works at the Hospital November 10th 
Canhanhi Nguende Sensibiladores de minas November 10th 
District Administrator District Administrator November 13th and 15th 
Francisco Chagaca Cleared Land in Minefield November 13th 
Bensami Chima Wants to Clear Land in the 
Minefield Next Year 
November 13th 
Samoni Nsigano Big Landowner November 13th 
Nolina Luis Husband takes over 2nd half November 14th 
Ussene Mário Small Farmer from Capata November 14th 
Maganha Jalitar Continues Overproduction 
of Maize 
November 14th 
Ernesto Ngadande Secretary of Capata Bairro  November 15th 
Alberto Socossi Bandeira Lost Goats in the Minefield November 15th 
Henriques Twoboi Brother of Previous Mfumo November 15th 
NPA donor visit  Visit to Minefield and Play 
on STD 
November 16th 
Bento Matenga Small Farmer November 17th 
Manuel Manvico Previous Priest  November 17th 
Ernesto Lissene Husband of Central 
Landowner 
November 17th 
Joaquina Janiel Woman Living by the Land 
Subsidence 
November 17th 
Domingas Salgado Immigrant having problems 
to access land 
November 18th 
 116
Francisco Uias Momeje Teacher November 18th 
Vicente Janota Alfaia Sensibiladores de minas November 20th 
Batista João Medical Assistant November 20th 
Calina Celemani Moved Out of Chifunde for 
Better Access to Land 
November 20th 
Antonio Silverio, Muarabo 
Cateia and Aleria Roniano 
Group Interview of Central 
Landowners 
November 20th 
Cristina Mário Moved Out of Chifunde for 
Better Access to Land 
November 21st 
Fernando Alberto Muicha District Police November 21st 
Alberto Ussene Small Farmer November 21st 
Bande NPA Deminig Camp November 21st 
 
HMA operator interviews 
Mike Wilson,  CIDC  October 3-6th and December 4-7th 
Artur Domingo Verissimo,  IND  October 5th 
Filipe Muzima  NPA  November 25th 
Derek Baxter  UN/ADP  December 4th  
Jackie D’Almeida,  UN/ADP  December 5th 
Felisberto João Navunga,   IND  December 6th 
Ismael Aderito,   Handicap International December 6th 
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Appendix C: Map of Chifunde 
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Appendix D: Mine Impact Score for Chifunde 
Example of LIS score summation sheet29 
Locality identifier:                District: Chifunde  Community: Chifunde 
 
 Indicators  Weights  Points Score 
       
The community reported that    to add  
       
 there were mines. If so, give 2 points __2__  
 there was unexploded ordnance. If so, give 1 point __0__  
   Subtotal for explosives realm: __2__ 
       
 access to some irrigated crop land was blocked. If so, give 0 points __0__  
 access to some rainfed crop land was blocked. If so, give 2 points __2__  
 access to some fixed pasture was blocked. If so, give 2 points __2__  
 access to some migratory pasture was blocked. If so, give 0 points __0__  
 access to some drinking water points was blocked. If so, give 2 points __0__  
 
access to some water points for other uses was 
blocked. If so, give 1 points __0__  
 access to some non-cultivated area was blocked. If so, give 1 points __1__  
       
 access to some housing area  was blocked. If so, give 0 points __0__  
 some roads were blocked. If so, give 1 points __0__  
 access to some other infrastructure was blocked. If so, give 1 points __0__  
 Total number of points (sum of  weights) to be equal to 10    
   Subtotal for socio-economic realm __5__ 
       
 there were __0_ mine victims in the last 24 months. Multiply with 2 __0__  
   Points for victims  __0__ 
       
   Total mine impact score:     7 
       
If the impact score is 0, rank the community as having "no known mine problem" 
If the score is between 1 and 5, the impact is considered to be "Low". 
If the score is between 5 and 10, the impact is considered to be "Medium" 
If the score is higher than 10, the impact is considered "High". 
       
 
                                                 
29 Aldo Benini, The Global Landmine Level-1 Impact Survey and Socio-Economic Indicators, Protocol 
Document no. 6 (Washington, Survey Action Center, 2000) 
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